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PREFACE
Born into a wealthy merchant family in London,
John Ruskin (1819-1900) had open to him all the educational
and career opportunities of his class. Yet, he acquired
no more than an A.B. at Oxford, and he did not pursue a
career in the family wine business, in the government, or
in the professions.

Instead, he spent his life between

living in London and traveling on the Continent, the whole
scrutinizing first art, then society, continually writing
about what he saw. He arrived at his conclusions without
reference to outside authority.

This independent thought

resulted in such statements as those in which he regarded
Rembrandt and Raphael as inferior artists and John Stuart
Mill, Adam Smith, and Jeremy Bentham as faulty economists.
Such pronouncements alienated him from many of his own
class, not only because he uttered heresy, but also be
cause he presumed authority in two seemingly disparate
fields. Yet, he was in wide demand as a lecturer on art,
and his being the first Slade Professor of Art at Oxford
•• *

Xll

was a high point in his career. The fact is, that although
Ruskin's teachings are individualistic, they conform so
well to fundamental truths, and here he appealed to many
people of all classes.

One of these fundamental truths

is that truly great art comes only from a society equal
to producing it.
The purpose of this study is to show how Ruskin
thought great art could be generated in a society.

He

sees this generation possible only in the hearts of all
members of a society. First, he defines what great art
is by locating its excellence in the heart of the indivi
dual artist rather than in external considerations of
technique or convention.

Second, he seeks to produce

\

conditions for a great society, the kind of society out
of which great artists can come. He defines greatness
in a society in the same terms that he defines greatness
in art, that is, society must try to produce happy people
rather than make more money.

Third, he shows how once

general welfare is achieved, then individuals of artistic
ability will immortalize that society in their art, thus
welding artist and society together.

In short, the artist,

rather than be repelled by what he sees around him,

iv

embodies the ideals of his people.

The union between art

and society, if it is to occur at all, must occur within
the individual.

V
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Although the years 1856-1860 span only a short time
in terms of Ruskin's long life and prolific work, they are
significant because during this time Ruskin not only for
mulates the characteristics of noble or great art, but he
also sets forth the corresponding characteristics that are
necessary in a society to produce such art.

For a true

union between art and society to exist, not only must a
nation provide for art, but art must, in turn, have ref
erence to the nation producing it. The fusion of the two
can only occur, however, when both put away theoretical
preoccupations that are not founded upon man's experience.
Only when they are guided by the truth of experience will
they become vital and enriching influences in men's lives.
Society then must provide for material well-being, and
art for spiritual and aesthetic well-being.

Both then

will serve mankind totally, and life will become ennobled.
That the year 1856 is a significant starting point
is indicated by Francis G. Townsend when he says that in
1

2
1871 Ruskin prepared some of his works for republication.
In the preface of Sesame and Lilies in this edition, Ruskin
tells how his early works were hampered by religious fervor
and a desire to show off his writing ability.

Except for

his pronouncements on "art, policy, or morality, as distinct
from religion," he therefore decided to "reprint scarcely
anything in this series out of the first and second volumes
of Modern Painters" and to "omit much of the Seven Lamps
and Stones of Venice."

However, he would reprint all of

his books written in the previous fifteen years "without
change." Townsend concludes by pointing out that in Ruskin's
own judgment., his earlier works were youthful experiments:
"His real work began in 1856, the year of Modern Painters
III and IV.
Following those two volumes were:

The Political

Economy of Art (1857), later titled A Joy Forever, The Two
Paths (1859), Modern Painters V (1860), and Unto This Last
(1860). Together with Modern Painters III and IV, these
works comprise the canon of this study.
^Ruskin and the Landscape Feeling: a Critical
Analysis of His Thought during the Crucial Years of His
Life, 1843-1856 (Urbana, Illinois, 1951), p. 80.
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In the first ten chapters of Modern Painters III
and the first five chapters of Modern Painters IV, Ruskin
clears up ambiguities and apparent contradictions for which
Modern Painters I and II had been criticized in connection
with his views on art and Turner's achievement.^ Ruskin
had been accused of contradicting himself in Modern Painters
II when he said that Turner was superior both in showing
details and in being visionary.^

In Modern Painters III

Ruskin defines his central position of what he means when
he says Turner is superior in an apparently contradictory
sense:
That art is the greatest which expresses the greatest
number of the noblest ideas. Art is the expression
of an artist's soul. A man may have soul and not be
able to paint, in which case he ought not to be a
painter. But, be his manipulation never so perfect,
he is not a great artist unless he is also capable
of receiving and imparting noble impressions.
The last eight chapters of Modern Painters III and
the last two chapters of Modern Painters IV ("The Mountain
Gloom" and "The Mountain Glory") are a treatise on the
^The Life of John Ruskin, 2nd ed.
(London, 1912), I, 343.
^Ibid., 338-39.
^Ibid., 339-40.

2 vols.
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history of man's attitudes toward natural scenery.^

In

these chapters Ruskin traces the gradual disappearance of
man's faith in God by comparing Greek, medieval, and modern
concepts of God in natural elements.

This loss of man's

faith figures strongly in Ruskin's view of error in modern
art and society.
The last two parts of Modern Painters V, "of Inven
tion Formal" and "of Invention Spiritual," are, as Edward
T. Cook says, "a treatise on 'the relations of Art to God
and man.'"^

In the chapters on "Invention Spiritual,"

Ruskin begins to define the interrelationship between art,
God, and man.

Here he departs from theoretical concerns

to a practical concern for the future of nations like
England which ignore the legitimate place of art and reli
gious devotion in national life.

As he closes this five-

volume effort, spanning seventeen years of intense thought
and observation, his concern for humanity, the apparent
digressive element in the work, is set forth as his real
concern. In "The Dark Mirror" he says that Modern Painters
^Ibid., 343-44.
^Ibid., 337.
^Ibid.
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has brought "everything to a root in human passion or human
hope." They were designed to defend Turner, but
they have been colored throughout,--nay, continually
altered in shape, and even warped and laroken, by di
gressions respecting social questions, which had for
me an interest tenfold greater than the work I had
been forced into undertaking.8
Indeed, had his father not prodded him, Ruskin may never
have completed Modern Painters.

As he worked on this last

volume, economic and political ideas vied with his attempt
to close this work on art. Art is still the ostensible
topic, but, according to Cook, "the inquiry leads him to
consider the right economy of labour."^
This overt concern for humanity is perhaps the
greatest distinguishing feature of Modern Painters, III,
IV, and V as compared to Modern Painters I and II. John
D. Rosenberg says that in the ten years between the second
and third volumes Ruskin "became less moved by the beauty
of art arid nature than by the waste, mystery, and terror
8

The Works of John Ruskin, ed. E. T. Cook and
Alexander Wedderburn, Library Edition, 39 vols. (London,
1903-1912), VII, 257. Reference to this edition will be
by volume and page number, and will be included in the text.
%ook, I, 529-30.
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of life."^®

His deepening sense of the tragic condition

of man is exemplified in the chapter, "The Mountain Gloom,"
in Modern Painters IV.The mountain peasantry barely
eke out a living from the rocky mountain, slopes.

They

share none of the religious inspiration that the grandeur
of the mountain peaks seems to suggest.

Cook says that

more and more Ruskin was disturbed by the apparent indif
ference of men toward trying to make their lives noble and
good:
The responsibilities of human life, the shortness of
the allotted span, as measured by the infinity of
things to be learnt and to be done, weighed heavily
upon a man whose curiosity was . . . unbounded. . . .^^
Both "The Mountain Gloom" and "The Mountain Glory" had a
practical purpose.

By marking this contrast between moun

tain glory and human misery, Ruskin hoped to arouse the
attention of his readers to help the mountain peasantry
better their condition.
^^The Darkening Glass: A Portrait of Ruskin's
Genius (New York, 1961), p. 22.
^^Ibid., pp. 24-25.
^^Cook, I, 509.
l^Ibid., 347.
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After completing Modern Painters III and IV, Ruskin
pursued his interest in man's condition more intensely.
He was in demand throughout England as a lecturer on art.
But, he was more concerned about the conditions necessary
in society for great art to be produced and honored.

In

July, 1857, he delivered two lectures on art and society
at Manchester, England. Later published as A Joy Forever,
these lectures outlined the responsibility of the people
in nurturing and preserving great art.

From 1858 to 1859

he delivered five more lectures in various towns. These
lectures, on how the characteristics of a nation are re
flected in that nation's art, were published as The Two
Paths. These two works connect Ruskin's theories of art
with economic and practical life.Through these lectures,
he was able to take his views to the masses of people,
those who were more doers than thinkers. He did not want
to write merely for a passive audience.

Cook says, "he

wanted to see, in the everyday world, some fruit of his
principles and labours.The reason A Joy Forever became
^^Derrick Leon, Ruskin:
(London, 1949), p. 266.
^^Cook, I, 430.

The Great Victorian
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the title of the Manchester lectures was that it summarized
all of Ruskin's teaching as far as he was concerned:

"If

only the English nation could be made to understand that
the beauty which is indeed to be a joy forever, must be
a joy for all."^^
The year 1860 is significant as a terminating point
in a study of Ruskin's works, because with the publication
of Unto This Last he began the social and economic criti
cism that was to occupy his chief thought the rest of his
life. The book ranked high in his estimation.

In 1877

he called Unto This Last "the central work of my life; . . .
it contained at once the substance of all that I have had
since to say."^^

He not only considered its message im

portant, but he also rated its simple style above the ornateness of Modern Painters.The superiority of the
book's style is also noted by Frederic Harrison, who says
it contains
all that is noble in Ruskin's written prose, with
hardly any, or very few, of his excesses and mannerisms.
^^Ibid., 431.
^^Ibid., II, 2.
l^ibid.
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. . . The book as a whole is a masterpiece of pure,
incisive, imaginative, lucid English.
In Unto This Last Ruskin attacks the purely theoret
ical science of political economy which ignores the broad
concerns for humanity in its justification of the processes
of industrialism. The force of his argument, carried for
ward in a spirit of ironic humor and mixed with a tone of
righteous indignation, is that by ignoring love and justice,
the things that truly motivate people, political economy
is not a science at all. Its theories are not based upon
society in its totality.

It considers only how men become

rich and ignores the equally important fact that men also
become poor.

In a nation pursuing such a dichotomous

course, Ruskin sees no sense of the kind of national life
and ideals conducive to the production of either great
art or noble living.
Ruskin's qualifications as an economist or social
critic were discounted by many people who could not con
ceive an art critic writing about economics.

However,

E. T. Cook says that Ruskin*s mind was analytical regard
less of whether artistic or economic principles were under
^^Tennyson, Ruskin, Mill, and Other Literary Esti
mates (New York, 1902), p. 69.
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consideration. His grasp of language and respect for words
served liim well in attacking the "masked words" of the
economists.

Further, Ruskin grew up in a merchant's house,

and was aware of his father's dealings in the wine business.
Cook says other qualifications such as "his first-hand
knowledge of arts and crafts gave him a real insight into
the finer qualities of work, and a considerable advantage
over many of the arm-chair economists." His extensive
travels in western and southern Europe also gave him in
sights into agricultural and national life.^®
Ruskin's concern for the working classes was not
a sudden thing in 1860.

When he was young, he heard his

father's Spanish partner in their wine business speak deprecatingly about the Spanish and French peasants who worked
in their vineyards.

Young Ruskin, however, knew that these

lowly people produced the wine that not only brought satis
faction to the upper classes, but also supported his own
family. In 1847 as he toured Scotland, he noted in his
diary how cheerful fishermen were, despite their hard
lives.Between 1848 and 1858, as he toured the Continent,
20cook, II, 12.
2lFrederick W. Roe, The Social Philosophy of
Carlvle and Ruskin CNew York. 1921). DO. 136-37.
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he saw luxury and misery developing side by side.

In

France in 1848 he saw masses of lower-class people on the
verge of violence in Paris and Rouen. These things greatly
upset him, for he not only felt guilty about his own wellbeing, but he noticed the contrast between God's work in
the beauty of nature and the apparent absence of it in
human nature.
By 1852 he was ready to publicly express his views
on politics, and he drafted three letters to the Times.
However, his father, fearing for his son's reputation,
succeeded in suppressing the letters, and Ruskin shelved
them. Yet, some of his views came through in the chapter,
"The Nature of Gothic" in The Stones of Venice, which he
was writing at this time.^^
The years 1856-1860 saw more than a maturing of
Ruskin*s artistic thought in Modern Painters III and IV
and a maturing of his social thought in Unto This Last.
Most important is the maturing of his concept of the inter
relationship of these major facets of man's being.

For

art to be great, it must have reference to the society
^^ibid., p. 138.
^^cook, I, 277.
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producing it.

Where before he spoke about the necessity

of art to refer to nature to be great, he now shifts this
reference to man and society.

Yet, the quality of life

in a nation must be such that its artists, in a spirit
of devotion or worship, seek to immortalize national life
in their art.
However, the energy of nineteenth-century, indus
trial England was being spent in widening the gulf between
rich and poor. With materialism and technology as the
sole considerations in most industrial and political lead
ers' minds, the necessary human and spiritual grounds for
great art were not included in national goals.

As long

as this condition lasted, neither material welfare for
the poorer masses of men nor spiritual and aesthetic health
for all Englishmen was possible. The qualities of mind
that Ruskin set forth as necessary for great art became
the same qualities necessary for the ennobling of society.
This is the direction Ruskin's thought took in the years
1856-1860.

CHAPTER II
GREATNESS IN ART
As Ruskin opens Modern Painters III, he determines
to define what makes art great:
1 have said that the art is greatest which includes
the greatest ideas; but I have not endeavoured to de
fine the nature of this greatness in the ideas them
selves. We speak of great truths, of great beauties,
great thoughts. What is it which makes one truth greater
than another, one thought greater than another?^
His first concern is to show the error that occurs
when the atterr^t is made to define great art in a purely
technical sense.

He notes the "supposed distinction" be

tween the "Great and Low Schools" of art. The former school
is purported to be "descriptive of a certain noble manner
of painting" that is to be revered by art students. The
latter school is characterized as "vulgar," "low," or
"realist^" and art students are taught to avoid it (V, 19).
Ruskin questions this "highness" in art:
^he Works of John Ruskin, ed. E. T. Cook and Alex
ander Wedderburn, Library Edition, 39 vols. (London, 19031912), \r, 19. Reference to this edition will be by volume
and page number^ and will be included in the text.
13
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Has it been, or is it, a true highness, a true princeliness, or only a show of it, consisting in courtly
manners and robes of state? (V, 19)
To answer this question, Ruskin draws upon the art
theories of Sir Joshua Reynolds in The Idler.

In his

essays Reynolds tries to distinguish between the "Great"
and "Low" schools of art along purely technical lines.

He

says that the Italian painters belong to the "Great" school
because they excel in a style which corresponds to that of
imaginative poetry.

He relegates the Dutch painters to the

"Low" school because they excel in a mechanical imitation
of their subject matter "in which the slowest intellect
is always sure to succeed best" (V, 21-22).

Reynolds bases

his distinction upon the kind of details the painters use.
Because Dutch painting "attends to literal truth and minute
exactness in the details of nature modified by accident,"
it uses "variable" details, corresponding to those which
historical writing uses.

On the other hand, the Italians

use "invariable" details as they treat of spiritual and
eternal subjects.

Reynolds concludes:

"Works which attend

only to the invariable are full of genius and soul" (V, 24).
To show the error of Reynolds' reasoning, Ruskin
applies his criteria to poetic writing, an example of "High"

15
art, and examines the kinds of details which appear in such
writing. Does poetic art use only invariable details?

Does

the appearance of variable details render a work unpoetic
as Reynolds states?

Ruskin answers both of these questions

in the negative, and he shows the invalidity of Reynolds*
distinction by examining some lines from Byron's "The Pri
soner of Chillon." Ruskin finds that Byron draws heavily
upon variable details in writing his poem.

Ruskin cites

these lines:
A thousand feet in depth below
The massy waters meet and flow;
So far the fathom line was sent
From Chillon's snow-white battlement.
A purely historical rendering of these lines appears as
follows: "The lake was sounded from the walls of the Castle
of Chillon, and found to be a thousand feet deep." If
Reynolds is right, Byron will have left out unnecessary,
"variable," details and included only the invariable, for
example, "the points which the Lake of Geneva and Castle
of Chillon have in common with all other lakes and castles"
(V, 25-26).
Yet, such words as "below," "massy," "meet and
flow," "fathom line," and "snow-white" are details not
absolutely necessary to describe Chillon:

16
This is a curious result. Instead of finding, as we
expected, the poetry distinguished from the history
by the omission of details, we find it consist entirely
in the addition of details; and instead of being
characterized by regard only of the invariable, we
find its whole power to consist in the clear expres
sion of what is singular and particular! (V, 25-27)
Although it would appear that Reynolds had reversed his
terms, and that poetry should be defined as having variable
and history invariable details, Ruskin warns that this would
be an erroneous conclusion, too.
Reynolds and those who try to classify art according
to intellectual or technical questions are on the wrong
track. It is not the addition or subtraction of certain
kinds of details that determines historical or poetical
utterance, but rather:
There is something either in the nature of the details
themselves, or the method of using them, which invests
them with poetical or historical propriety. (V, 27-28)
As in poetry, so in painting:
. . . w e shall, therefore, find presently that a
painting is to be classed in the great or inferior
schools, not according to the kind of details which
it represents, but according to the uses for which
it en^loys them. (V, 30-31)
Ruskin shifts attention as to the components of great art
from the purely technical aspects, the tools, to the intent
of the artist or writer.

The truth which Reynolds glossed
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over was that the greatness of a painting lies not in the
technique, that is, in the materials, or subject, or method
of treatment, but rather "in the nobleness of the end to
which the effort of the painter is addressed" (V, 42).
This nobility is determined by how much of the
artist's soul becomes involved in his art.

Evidence of

this involvement of soul appears in four ways.
appears in his love for his subject matter.

First, it

This love in

volves the suppression of his ego in deference to his sub
ject matter, or content.

Allied to this love for subject

matter is the quality of seeing nature clearly.

The task

does not lie in "simple" imitation, for to capture nature
as she is, is highly challenging. Third, the artist must
love beauty consistent with natural fact.

The ugly must

be taken with the beautiful for true beauty to exist in
art.

Last, and most important, the artist must possess

invention, the imaginative quality which either presents
visions in the artist's mind or participates in the arrange
ment of observed or remembered fact.

All these elements

must appear, in varying degrees, in a work of art for it
to be great (V, 65-66).

Matters of technique, formula,

theory, or convention simply get in the way, and prevent

18
the artist's communication of experience, or nature, to
the viewer.
I. LOVE OF SUBJECT MATTER
Great artists choose noble subjects, which involve
"wide interests and profound passions, as opposed to those
which involve narrow interests and slight passions." The
habitual choice of such sacred subjects as the Nativity,
Transfiguration, or Crucifixtion shows a natural tendency
to depict highest human thoughts.
Supper" is an example.

Leonardo's "The Last

On the next lower level would be

Raphael's "School of Athens," which depicts great men.
The third order includes "passions and events of ordinary
life." There are degrees in this last order, too. Paint
ings, such as Hunt's "Claudio and Isabella," which show
deep thoughts and sorrows are higher than those which treat
of brutalities and vices for no instructive purpose
(V, 48-49).
If Ruskin were merely content to impose his own
standards of ranking art, then he could be accused of com
mitting a worse error than Reynolds did.
proceeded on logical grounds.

Reynolds at least

But Ruskin does not stop
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at merely a moral ranking of subject matter as an index of
nobility.

He is quick to refer again to the devotional

state of mind of the artist toward his subject. This is
the factor which Reynolds had over-looked. The choice of
subject,, Ruskin says, must be "sincere." That is, it must
be "made from the heart."

When this qualification enters,

the order of nobility can become reversed. Painters of
peasant's brawls and childrens' games raise the nobleness
of their subjects when they paint them sincerely.

Noble

subjects are frequently chosen insincerely. The reason
for this is that such choices are made out of ambition and
vanity.

Such an artist

mistakes his
greatness of
"the ideal,"
nor capacity

vanity for inspiration, his ambition for
soul, and takes pleasure in what he calls
merely because he has neither humility
enough to comprehend the real. (V, 49-50)

Although great artists are aware of the excellence
of their work in comparison to that of other artists, and
the world in general, nevertheless they are humble. They
simply accept this separation between the high quality
of their own labor and the low quality of the labor of
others as a matter of fact (V, 331). The reason for this
quiet acceptance is that there is a basic unity between
their genuine nature and their work.

They produce what

20
they are. In this respect Ruskin values Scott and Turner
somewhat more than Wordsworth, whom he considers "often
affected in his simplicity" (V, 332). This truth to self
helps the young artist find his way through all the various
theories and teachings about creating art.

He may gain

quick attention by following popular fads or theories,
but if he paints true to himself, he will be painting better
pictures, even if he is not popular (XVI^ 295).
The reason such an artist will paint better pic
tures is that he will become less self-conscious. He will
be able to concentrate more on his subject.

When this

happens, he becomes more closely linked to the truth of
his world. Ruskin says that a great artist never can be
egotistic:
The whole of his power depends upon his losing sight
and feeling of his own existence, and becoming a mere
witness and mirror of truth. . . . (V, 125)
There is no room for the "I" in great art, and it is the
willingness, indeed, the innately felt necessity of re
moving or suppressing the "l" which Ruskin refers to when
he speaks of the morality of the artist.

He denies that

he says only a good man can produce great art. What he
does say is that an artist needs the one quality of

perceiving the goodness of nature, a quality that requires
"certain moral conditions." The artist may be "warped"
in his personal life, and he may be talented, nevertheless.
But, the one element he needs to produce great art is a
true perception of nature, or his subject, whether this
makes him a good man or not (XVI, 310).

Charles Dougherty

states why this requirement is so necessary to achieve
greatness. He says that according to Ruskin, our moral
nature is not a perceiving thing in itself.

It operates

through love, or "the capacity to lose sight of one's
self. . . . The passions of love energize and sharpen the
intellect and the sensibilities."

If an artist does not

love his subject, he "will not be able to know it because
his senses and intellect will lack the extra dimension of
passionate intensity that is added by love."
This love, or attitude of devotion, toward the
subject achieves the synthesis between fact and art that
Ruskin deems essential.

In Modern Painters II he details

how this synthesis is achieved when he describes the
^"Ruskin's Moral Argument," Victorian Newsletter,
No. 9 (1957), p. 6.
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penetrative imagination.

O

It pierces external appearance

and "plunges into the very central fiery heart" of things.
"Its function and gift are the getting at the root, its
nature and dignity depend on its holding things always
by the heart." Ruskin calls this faculty "the highest
intellectual power of man" (IV, 250-51).

But, Ruskin warns

that we must not confuse sensibility with sensitive pene
tration.

He is not talking about mere sentiment which plays

on the surfaces of things:

"Sensitive feeling reaches be

low sentiment with the more real power of penetrating to
the truth.For the penetrative imagination, as an "in
tellectual" power, to be operative, the artist needs the
prior condition of love toward his subject and the complete
abnegation of himself in deference to conveying the message
that subject seems to offer.
Ruskin seems to attribute the artistic excellence
of Shakespeare and Turner to their power of penetrative
imagination.

Inherent in his consideration of these artists

is his admiration for their negation of self.

Shakespeare

^Bernard Bosanquet, A History of Aesthetic, 2nd
ed. (London, 1966), p. 458.
^enry Ladd, The Victorian Morality of Art: An
Analysis of Ruskin's Aesthetic (New York, 1932), p. 212.
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succeeds in depicting the germ of human nature in his
characters.

He

sympathizes so completely with all creatures as to
deprive himself, together with his personal identity,
even of his conscience, as he casts himself into their
hearts. (VI, 440)
Shakespeare succeeds because by negating himself, he can
become several different persons. He is capable of a mul
tiple personality that he could not have, if, instead of
seizing the essence of his characters first, he became
preoccupied with problems of technique.
Ruskin attributes Turner's superior power to his
ability to subordinate himself to his subject and allow
his penetrative imagination to reveal truths which are
hidden to pure formalists.

After he details the Turnerian

mind in terms of its imaginative qualities in producing
"Turnerian topography," Ruskin concludes that the imagina
tion, rather than a faculty suspect, is to be the most
trusted:
In its work, the vanity and individualism of the man
himself are crushed, and he becomes a mere instrument
or mirror, used by a higher power for the reflection
to others of a truth which no effort of his could ever
have ascertained. (VI, 44)
According to Waldo H. Dunn, Turner was an estab
lished and wealthy artist when Ruskin wrote the first
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volume of Modern Painters, the purpose of which was a de
fense of Turner against what Ruskin considered unjust crit
icism. Raskin was defending Turner's later "impression
istic" manner of painting against critics who judged only
by fidelity to convention.

Dunn goes on to say that Rus

kin* s attitude toward Turner's later impressionistic paint
ings was a modern one, that is, he searched for the intent
of the artist, the source from which the artist received
his impressions. In examining such sources, Dunn says,
Ruskin's: approach was scientific, not sentimental.^

Solo-

man Fishman concurs with Dunn's estimation of Ruskin's
criticism.

He says that Ruskin's description of the pene

trative imagination brought him close to enunciating the
modern definition of Expressionism. In defining this
quality of the imagination, Ruskin revolutionized art
theory by repudiating neo-classical idealization of nature
and focused on the artist's ability to get to inner truth
as a basis for a picture's reason for being.^

Ruskin was

calling for a genuine communication between the artist
^"Ruskin and the Values of Life," Lectures on Three
Eminent Victorians (Claremont, Calif., 1932), p. 41.
%he Interpretation of Art (Berkeley, Calif., 1963),
pp. 29-31.
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and men, accomplished only by a realistic discernment of
fact of experience so that convention and formula could
not get in the way.^
This need for communication of experience by the
artist to men made the intent, the "nobility of the end,"
of the artist so important to Ruskin. The love of the
artist for the particular experience he wishes to convey
insures that the communication will be a moral one.

Ruskin

requires that the spectator of a work of art needs a moral
sense capable of grasping the artist's communication of
a vital truth which the artist, in his turn, has, through
his penetrative imagination, discerned in nature, or
experience.

In this way the spectator, discerning the

truth the artist has conveyed, knows the work is moral,
Q

and so he can love what the artist has produced.

In short,

the viewer can love art, the end to which Ruskin's efforts
are directed.
Although love and devotion toward the subject must
be primary in the artist's mind, nevertheless technical
^Jerome H. Buckley, "The Moral Aesthetic," The
Victorian Temper (Cambridge, Mass., 1951), pp. 155-56.
Sibid., p. 153.
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excellence determines whether one truly can call himself
an artist in the first place.

One who cannot "both colour

and draw beautifully . . . has no business to consider him
self a painter at all ..." (V, 52).
Not only must there be technical excellence, but
even love for the subject does not mean great art will be
produced.

The artist must be honest with himself in deter

mining whether or not he has penetrative imagination.

He

must honestly assess his imaginative powers so that he
does not try to paint sacred subjects or great men if he
cannot enter their minds or imagine great events as they
really happened.

Otherwise, he will degrade

the subjects he intended to honour, and his work is
more utterly thrown away, and his rank as an artist is,
in reality, lower, than if he had devoted himself to
the imitation of the simplest objects of natural his
tory. (V, 50)
There is nothing ignoble, in Ruskin's eyes, about an artist
who pursues such a course:
Pure history and pure topography are most precious
things; in many cases more useful to the human race
than high imaginative work; and assuredly ... a large
majority ... in art should never aim at anything
higher. It is only vanity, never love, . . . which
prompts men to desert their allegiance to the simple
truth, in vain pursuit of the imaginative truth . . .
evermore sealed to them. (VI, 29)
A noble imagination cannot be resisted. If an artist
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doubts he has imagination, or if he can resist it, then
he should
. . . never try to be a prophet; go on quietly with
your hard camp-work, and the spirit will come to you
in the camp . . . ; but try above all things to be
quickly perceptive of the noble spirit in others. . . .
(VI, 29)
Although love of the subject can quicken the per
ceptive qualities of the mind and can cause the artist
to forget himself so that the penetrative imagination
yields up the essence of the subject, this feeling for
the subject can also have an opposite effect when, through
strong feeling, the artist allows these feelings to obscure
the true nature of the subject matter.

Ruskin describes

this effect when he calls it the "pathetic fallacy."

Basi

cally, it is the true appearance of lifeless things in
nature on the one hand and "the extraordinary, or false
appearances, when we are under the influence of emotion .
. ." (V, 204).
The pathetic fallacy is a quality of modern artists,
especially writers.

The artist expresses

something which he, as a living creature, imagines
in the lifeless object, while the classical and
medieval artists were content with expressing the
unimaginary and actual qualities of the object it
self. (V, 221)

The reason the pathetic fallacy occurs is because moderns
have removed God from nature, and they have theorized that
natural things are purely physical. Yet, their religious
instinct, left without a divine reference, nevertheless
overcomes theory when they personally confront nature,
which seems alive.

We give in to our religious instinct,

and instead of ascribing this "unaccountable life" to the
workings of God, we ascribe human feelings to the natural
elements, and so we commit the pathetic fallacy (V, 231).
Ruskin compares Keats, who has committed the pathetic
fallacy, with Homer, who does not.

Keats has described

an incoming wave as breaking with a "wayward indolence."
"Wajward" and "indolent" are terms which basically des
cribe human actions, but Keats transposes these terms to
a sea wave which then seems to have a life or motive power
of its own:
But Homer would never have written, never thought of,
such words. He could not . . . have lost sight of
the great fact that the wave, ... do what it might,
was still . . . salt water; and that salt water could
not be either wayward or indolent. (V, 221-22)
Instead, the waves are "over-roofed," "fiill-charged,"
"monstrous," "compact-black," "dark-clear," "violetcolored," "wine-colored," and so on.

These epithets
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describe pure physical nature:
. . . they are as accurate and intense in truth as
words can be, but they never show the slightest feel
ing of anything animated in the ocean. Black or clear,
monstrous or violet-colored, cold salt water it is
always, and nothing but that. (V, 220)
It is not that Homer did not feel as strongly about the
sea as Keats.

Actually, Homer had stronger feelings.

But,

he separates the sense of life in the sea into "a great
abstract image of a Sea Power:
He never says the waves rage, or the waves are idle.
But he says there is somewhat in, and greater than,
the waves, which rages, and is idle, and that he calls
a god. (V, 220-21)
Homer's perception of nature is accurate because his faith
in divine beings answers his religious instinct.

The divine

and the physical are separated in his mind; he does not
confuse the two as Keats does. There is a healthy control
of emotion as to physical nature, strong as that emotion
is. Instead of imposing his own emotions upon natural
elements, he attributes their evident sentiency to the
divine beings he believes in, while at the same time seeing
the elements as the dead, lifeless, or insentient things
they are. Homer, then, succeeds in the same suppression
of ego that Ruskin admires in Shakespeare and Turner.
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Ruskin goes on to explain what a Greek's idea of
a god was.

Fire, for example, seemed just as ravenous and

pitiless to him as it does to Keats.

The Greek also felt

that the sea-wave was wayward or idle.

But, he reasoned

that he could light or put out the fire and dry up the
water or drink it.

It is not the fire or the water that

rages or is wayward.

Rather, there is something m these

elements which cannot be either controlled or destroyed,
any more than I destroy myself by cutting off my fin
ger; I was in my finger,--something of me at least
was; I had a power over it, and felt pain in it,
though I am still as much myself when it is gone.
So there may be a power in the water which is not
water, but to which the water is as a body;--which
can strike with it, move in it, suffer in it, yet
not be destroyed in it. This something, this great
Water Spirit, I must not confuse with the waves,
which are only its body. They may flow hither and
thither, increase or diminish. That must be indivisible--imperishable--a god. So of fire also; those
rays which I can stop, and in the midst of which I
cast a shadow, cannot be divine, nor greater than I.
They cannot feel, but there may be something in them
that feels,--a glorious intelligence, as much nobler
and more swift tha.n mine, as these rays, which are
its body, are nobler and swifter than my flesh.. . .
(V,222-23)
The Greek also believed that such powers, or intelligences,
within the elements could assume human form at will so that
they could communicate with men or do anything else for
which their "proper body, whether fire, earth, or air, was
unfitted":
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And it would have been to place them beneath, instead
of above, humanity, if, assuming the form of man, they
could not also have tasted his pleasures. (V, 223)
As an example of the gods' ability to come out of their
natural element and assume human form, Ruskin cites the
passage in the Iliad in which the river Scamander defends
the Trojans against Achilles.

To deal with Achilles, the

river god assumes a human form, which Achilles nevertheless
recognizes as that of the river god.

Achilles addresses

it as a river, not as a man, and its voice is that of a
river, "out of the deep whirlpools."

When Achilles refuses

to obey it, it changes from its human form back into its
natural, or divine form, and tries to overwhelm him with
waves:
Vulcan defends Achilles, and sends fire against the
river, which suffers in its water-body, till it is
able to bear no more. At last even the "nerve of the
river," or "strength of the river" . . . , feels the
fire, and this "strength of the river" addresses Vulcan
in supplications for respite. There is in this pre
cisely the idea of a vital part of the river-body,
which acted and felt, and which, if the fire reached
it, was death, just as would be the case if it touched
a vital part of the human body. (V, 223-24)
Their gods acted in nature, whereas moderns theorize that
nature is motivated by physical laws only.

The Greeks

never tried to contradict their instinctive sense that
God was ever37where.

What sympathy or fellowship a Greek
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had "were always for the spirit ^ the stream, not for
the stream ..." (V, 231).

He accepted the spirit in

natural elements as "plain fact," the forces of these
elements when ruled by such a spirit as plain fact, and
the deadness of these elements when "without their spirit":
a rose was good for scent, and a stream for sound and
coolness; for the rest, one was no more than leaves,
the other no more than water; he could not make any
thing else of them; and the divine power, which was
involved in their existence, having been all distilled
way by him into an independent Flora or Thetis, the
poor leaves or waves were left, in mere cold corporealness, to make the most of their even being discernibly
red and soft, clear and wet, and unacknowledged in
any other power whatsoever. (V, 230)
In defining his faith, the Greek "threw it entirely
into a human form, and gave his faith to nothing but the
image of his own humanity. . . . Content with his human
S3nnpathy,

he approached the actual waves" and woods "with

no sjmipathy at all" (V, 230). Consequently, the Greek
believed his landscape subservient to "human comfort, to
the foot, the taste, or the smell" (V, 230). The Odessey
has many references to "pleasant landscape" in which their
every feature is "quietly subjugated to human service."
Ruskin points out how Ulysses reveals his identity to his
father Laertes, "whom he finds at work in his garden,
'with thick gloves on, to keep his hands from the thorns,'"
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by reminding him of the vines, pear-trees, and apple trees
Laertes gave him as a youth (V, 234). There are other
references to Ulysses* kissing the "corn-giving land" when
he finds land after being ship-wrecked (V, 238).
The medieval mind, however, did not see landscape
as of service to man for essential needs as the Greeks
did. Peasants did menial work, while the nobility consider
ed their landscape as a place to play and make love only.
This change brought about a less solemn, divine aspect
of the land.

Ho offerings to God were made of the land's

fruits:
As the idea of a definite spiritual presence in material
nature was lost, the mysterious sense of unaccountable
life in the things themselves would be increased, and
the mind would instantly be laid open to all those
currents of fallacious, but pensive and pathetic sym
pathy, which we have seen to be characteristic of modern
times. (V, 251)
Yet, although Ruskin considers tfee pathetic fallacy
as a weakening quality in art, he does aot condemn it.
With his emphasis upon the Greeks' genuine belief in God,
compared to the modern lack of faith, Ruskin condemns the
faithlessness which gives rise to the pathetic fallacy.
Yet, as a result of strong feeling, the pathetic fallacy
gives evidence that men still react to their world genuine
ly. and Ruskin forsives the pathetic fallacy for this
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reason. What he condemns is the affectation of feeling,
a false pathetic fallacy, the sort that Pope uses, reveal
ing his "cool blood.To distinguish no pathetic fallacy,
false pathetic fallacy, and genuine pathetic fallacy, Ruskin
compares Homer, Pope, and Keats in their treatment of a
passage rendered originally by Homer. When Ulysses and
his companions flee the Circean palace, they unknowingly
leave behind the body of Elpenor, the youngest follower,
whom they do not know is dead.

After they cross the sea

to safe land, Ulysses "summons the shades from Tartarus."
Elpenor's is the first to appear.

Startled, Ulysses ad

dresses the spirit simply, but in a manner of "bitter and
terrified lightness":

"Elpenor?

the shadowy darkness?

Hast thou come faster on foot than

How comest thou under

I in my black ship?" Pope's rendition is:
Oj say, what angry power Elpenor led
To glide in shades, and wander with the dead?
How could thy soul, by realms and seas disjoined,
Outfly the nimble sail, and leave the lagging
wind?
Pope does not utter a pathetic fallacy at all as to the
nimbleness of the sail and the laziness of the wind. He
^J. D. Thomas, "Poetic Truth and Pathetic Fallacy,"
Texas Studies in Literature and Language, III (1961), 346-47.
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utters the wrong passion, agonized curiosity.

But, Ulysses

wants to know the facts of the matter; and the very
last thing his mind could do at the moment would be
to pause, or suggest in any wise what was not a fact.
The delay in the first three lines, and conceit in
the last, jar upon us instantly, like the most fright
ful discord in music. (V, 206)
Keats, however, asks a similar question with "exquisite
sincerity":
He wept, and his bright tears
Went trickling down the golden bow he held.
Thus, with half-shut, suffused eyes, he stood;
While from beneath some cumb'rous boughs hard by.
With solemn step, an awful goddess came.
And there was purport in her looks for him.
Which he with eager guess began to read:
Perplexed the while, melodiously he said,
'How cam'St thou over the unfooted sea?'
"Therefore," Ruskin says, "we see that the spirit of truth
must guide us in some sort, even in our enjoyment of fal
lacy." (V, 207)
Pope, Keats, and Homer illustrate the three orders
of poets, according to Ruskin.

The lowest, exemplified

by Pope, are those who see truly but feel nothing. They
employ their subject matter to illustrate their own tech
nical skill. The second order are poets like Keats and
Tennyson whose emotions overcome their intellect.
see untruly and commit the pathetic fallacy.

They

The first

order, to which Homer and Dante belong, consists of poets
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whose intellectual and emotional faculties are strong but
balanced. There is a fourth, prophetic order, that of
the Biblical prophets, whose strong intellects are over
come by emotion nevertheless, when they contemplate certain
God-made events (V, 209).
It is important to emphasize that by "second order"
Ruskin does not mean "second-rate."^®

George Whaley makes

this error when he says that Ruskin believes "second-rate
art--or worse—arises from the inability to control emotion,
and this failure is a sign of morbidity and weakness.
It is not excess of feeling that Ruskin deplores, but the
absence of feeling.

As long as the emotion which causes

the pathetic fallacy is true, then the fallacy is pleasant.
But if the metaphor is not meant but done only for effect,
then that is reprehensible.

A true emotion means it comes

from perceiving pure fact which gives rise to the emotion
(V, 210-11).
Ruskin*s concern is always for a genuine communica
tion of the essence of subject matter to the viewer or
^^Ibid., 346.
^^"Pathetic Fallacy," Queen's Quarterly, LVII
(Winter, 1950), 522.
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reader. He looks at the intent of the artist as revealed
in the work of art to make this determination.
error in the artist's mind is a natural fact.

A genuine
The artist

cannot help it. If this results in a defective communica
tion, then the work cannot be condemned. It is not the
best, but it Is the best the artist, true to himself, can
do. Through the pathetic fallacy, Ruskin is able to recon
cile the paradox of defective beauty with truth.

He does

so by relating the pathetic fallacy to the truth of the
mind, psychological truth.12

If there is no artifice in

the appearance of the pathetic fallacy in a work of art,
then the fallacy can be trusted and enjoyed.

It is an

imposition of the self upon natural fact, but as it cannot
be helped, and as it is not an act of pride or pure tech
nique, then It is moral.
Ruskin places Scott in a category of his own in
terms of Scott's response to Landscape. Scott neither re
gards nature as being dead like Homer does, nor does he
impose his own feelings upon it as Keats and Tennyson do.
Rather, he senses nature as having a life of its own, in
dependent of himself.
^^Thomas, 347.

He does not commit the pathetic

38
fallacy; he does not place himself above nature, but he
puts nature above him.

He instinctively senses something

in nature, but he cannot identify it because of his lack
of faith. As an example, Ruskin cites these lines from
one of Scott's poems:
Yon lonely thorn,--would he could tell
The changes of his parent dell.
Since he, so gray and stubborn now.
Waved in each breeze a sapling boughI
Would he could tell, how deep the shade
A thousand mingled branches made.
How broad the shadows of the oak.
How clung the rowan to the rock.
And through the foliage showed his head.
With narrow leaves and berries red I
Scott does not consider the thorn's grayness or stubborness
because he feels dull or stubborn, nor does he consider
the "cheerful peeping forth of the rowan^ because he him
self is at that moment cheerful or curious." He perceives
the thorn and rowan as he would were he considering an
old man or a "climbing boy; forgetting himself, in sympathy
with either age or youth" (V, 337-38).
Scott displays the modern mind in general, "the
instinctive sense which men must have of the Divine pres
ence, not formed into distinct belief"

(V,

338).

The sense

of animation is "universal . . . , only varying in depth
according to the greatness of the heart that holds it"
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(V, 339).

As Scott is "more than usually intense, and

accompanied with infinite affection and quickness of sym
pathy," he conquers all tendency to the pathetic fallacy.
He "paints" nature as she is, and he refuses to allow his
own thoughts to intrude (V, 339).

For this reason, Ruskin

places Scott in an order which would be between the first
and second orders (V, 340).

Scott's deference to nature,

the suppression of his ego, gives him a higher standing
in Ruskin*s eyes.
Ruskin cites various erroneous forms of art that
have developed because artists took their eyes off their
subject matter and for various reasons, chiefly pride in
skill, produced their art according to technical concerns.
He calls picturesque art a "spurious form" of landscape
because it only displays "the skill of the artist, and his
powers of composition; or to give agreeable forms and
colours, irrespective of sentiment."

An example of this

art appears in modern Dutch paintings of street life and
church interiors (VII, 255).
This feeling for the merely picturesque was absent
in Greek art. The Greeks saw land only in terms of its
pleasantness, accessibility, and usefulness. The
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picturesque entered art when Renaissance artists, ignoring
the "truth," painted classical landscapes without a sense
of "quiet natural grace, sweetness of asphodel meadows,
tender aspen populars, or running vines."

Instead, they

painted only seaports or caves, the former appearing as
bays of "insipid sea" and the latter as rocks with holes
in them (V, 243-44).
Technique was considered before subject matter
in medieval times as well.

Regard for the subject took

one form when medieval art was used for communicative and
identifying purposes on armor, shields, and flags.

Although

Ruskin excuses this departure because it served a real
need, nevertheless, the practice furthered the obscuring
of natural beauty in art (V, 259).
Attention to technique also brought the downfall
of Gothic art. Ruskin notes how a statue of the Madonna
on Amiens Cathedral
marks the culminating point of Gothic art, because,
up to this time, the eyes of its designers had been
steadily fixed on natural truth--they had been ad
vancing from flower to flower, from form to form,
from face to face,--gaining perpetually in knowledge
and veracity--therefore, perpetually in power and in
grace.
But, there was a change:

Attention shifted from the statue
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to its niche and from floral ornament to the mouldings
enclosing it.

Where formerly imperfections had appeared

in walls and statues in the builders* efforts to convey the
significance of their subject, now perfect harmony between
lines of the building and the statues became the builders'
aim. A sense of calculation entered.

Although this tech

nical perfection produced a beautiful result, the builders
developed pride in their skill.

Where delight had been

in the things they thought as they carved, now they con
centrated on how cleverly they could put the stones to
gether.

Gothic art became

a mere expression of wanton expenditure, and vulgar
mathematics; and was swept away ... by the severer
pride, and purer learning, of the schools founded on
classical traditions. (XVI, 282-83)
II. SEEING NATURE CLEARLY
There is another reason why technique must be
eliminated as a consideration in the artist's approach to
his work. Seeing nature clearly, closely perceiving the
mere physical qualities of the subject matter, is enough
of a problem in itself. It is so challenging that it
renders insignificant the role of the artist's self.
Further, it is a far greater challenge to an artist's
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skill than the mere mastery of a convention.

Ruskin places

this ability in its true perspective when he says.
The greatest thing a human soul ever does in this world
is to see something, and tell what it saw in a plain
way. Hundreds of people can talk for one who can think,
but thousands can think for one who can see. To see
clearly is poetry, prophecy, and religion,--all in one.
(V, 333)
A "seer" is grounded to the world, the facts of his exist
ence, much better than a thinker, who is given to ephemeral
things, ideas not grounded in what has been seen:
Metaphysics would, indeed, have led me far astray long
ago, if I had not learned also some use of my hands,
eyes, and feet. (V, 333-34)
Great artists try to include, in their work, "the
largest possible quantity of Truth in the most perfect
possible harmony." As much of nature as possible should
be included in the work of art. This inclusion of nature's
diversity and variety in a harmonious relationship is a
far greater testimony to an artist's skill, and devotion,
than the elimination of as much as possible of nature for
pleasing effect.

Ruskin compares the work of two painters,

Veronese and Rembrandt, to illustrate what he means. He
considers Rembrandt inferior to Veronese because Rembrandt
obscures most of a picture to bring out a single truth,
such as the play of light on jewelry or faces.

Veronese,
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on the other hand,
chooses to represent the great relations of visible
things to each other, to the heaven above, and to the
earth beneath them. He holds it more important to show
how a figure stands relieved from delicate air, or
marble wall; how as a red, or purple, or white figure,
it separates itself, in clear discernibility, from
things not red, nor purple, nor white; how infinite
daylight shines round it; how innumerable veils of
faint shadow invest it; how its blackness and darkness
are, in excess of their nature, just as limited and
local as its intensity of light; all this, I say, he
feels to be more important than showing merely the
exact measure of the spark of sunshine that gleams
on a dagger-hilt, or glows on a jewel. (V, 58-59)
The challenge of an accurate and complete portrayal of the
truths of nature become fully evident in this passage.
Yet, in his call for a complete rendition of nature, Ruskin
is not calling for absolute clarity, the inclusion of every
single detail.

Such terms as "clear discernibility," "in

finite daylight," and "intensity of light" must not give
such an impression.

He also refers to the "blackness and

darkness" of "innumerable veils of faint shadow."

It is

in this dual condition of obscurity and clarity of nature
that the artist's skill is challenged. The artist who,
like Veronese, masters this aspect of nature has accomplish
ed far more than one who simply masters a convention.
The fact is that indistinctness is necessary if
great art is to show the truth in nature:
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. . . there is a continual mystery caused throughout
all spaces, caused by the absolute infinity of things.
WE NEVER SEE ANYTHING CLEARLY. . . . Everything we
look at, be it large or small, near or distant, has
an equal quantity of mystery in it. - . . What we call
seeing a thing clearly, is only seeing enough of it
to make out what it is I
An open book and a handkerchief, for example, are indis
tinguishable a quarter of a mile away. The mystery attaches
to the whole of each object.

Closer, we see the one is

a book, the other a handkerchief, but we cannot read the
one nor trace the embroidery in the other.
exists in the details.

The mystery

But, after we can read the book

and trace the embroidery, the mystery exists in the paper's
fibres and the handkerchief's threads, and so on.
closer we perceive, the deeper goes the mystery.

The
In this

sense we do^not clearly see the book, even though we know
it is one. When most artists paint an object, they get
only close enough to recognize the object for what it is.
But, there still is mystery as to finer details (VI, 75-76).
Seeing clearly, then, is a relative term.
Veronese, Titian, and Tintoretto produce works
that are like nature in their being distinct generally,
but obscure in fine details:
. . . when compared with work that has no meaning,
all great work is distinct,--compared with work that
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has narrow and stubborn meaning, all great work. is
indistinct.
If everything in a painting can be clearly made out, it
is not first-rate work:

"EXCELLENCE OF THE HIGHEST KIND,

WITHOUT OBSCURITY, CANNOT EXIST" (VI, 80-81).
John D. Rosenberg says that Ruskin voices these
arguments to answer critics' charges that he contradicts
himself in calling for clarity in paintings while defending
the misty nature of Turner's paintings.

Ruskin is trying

to show that Turner is superior to the idealizing Italian
painters on the one hand and the Dutch realists on the
other. Turner's superiority is that he lies between these
two schools and most effectively represents nature as
partially clear, partially obscure.Rosenberg goes on
to say that in maintaining that an artist must be true
to nature, Ruskin is not advocating photographic reproduc
tion:
For Ruskin nature was infinitely various, infinitely
potent, but visible only to eyes which, in Wordsworth's
phrase, half-create what they perceive. Imitation
was impossible; the re-creation of part of nature's
infinity was all the artist could hope for. Turner
The Darkening Glass: A Portrait of Ruskin s
Genius (New York, 1961), pp. 10-11.
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created the largest segment, and was thus at once the
most truthful and creative of landscapists.
There is a moral reason why cloudiness or mistiness
in a painting is good:

It appeals to our sense of happi

ness in having only partial knowledge of our existence.
"If we insist upon perfect intelligibility and complete
declaration in every moral subject, we shall instantly
fall into misery of unbelief." We have an innate sense
that only so much knowledge as we can bear is given us.
To resent cloudiness and mistiness is a result of pride.
Although "utter darkness and ignorance is indeed unmanly,"
to pursue knowledge and light because of pride is errone
ous, too,

"Men perished in seeking knowledge. ..."

We

must be humble and then our state of relative ignorance
becomes pleasurable:
. , . every rightly constituted mind ought to rejoice
... in feeling that there is infinitely more which
it cannot know. None but proud or weak men would mourn
over this, for we may always know more if we choose,
by working on, but the pleasure is ... to humble
people3 in knowing that the journey is endless and the
treasure inexhaustible. . . . (VI, 89-90)
This is an example of Ruskin's dialectic. It is similar
to that mentioned in the first section of this chapter,
^^Ibid., pp. 11-12.
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that of losing one's ego to master one's art, which is
a "losing" of one's "life" to find it. Here, Ruskin calls
for the denial of one's understanding to'gain more under
standing.

Mistiness and obscurity in art, in showing this

aspect of nature, reminds man of his ignorance and the
need for continued study of his world.
The indistinctness of nature in art attests to
the mystery surrounding nature's origin, and communicates
this question to the viewer.

Such indistinctness occurs

when a great artist deals with his perception of the un
known, the province of highest knowledge. Ruskin states
the paradoxical nature of "high" knowledge, whether of
the spiritual world or physical nature, and its effect
upon an artist's work:
. . . to know anything well involves a profound sen
sation of ignorance, while yet it is equally true that
good and noble knowledge is distinguished from vain
and useless knowledge chiefly by its clearness and
distinctness. . . .
The best drawing involves a wonderful perception
and expression of indistinctness; and yet all noble
drawing is separated from the ignoble by its distinct
ness . . . and firm assertion of Something; whereas
bad drawing . . . asserts Nothing. (V, 60-61)
In all this discussion about indistinctness, misti
ness, and mystery, it must not be forgotten that Ruskin
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deems clarity just as important, too. He is simply trying
*

to reconcile these opposite aspects of great art by identi
fying them in nature first and then showing their place
in art.

The inclusion of these qualities in art is so

complex that it is difficult to theorize.

Great artists

simply have the ability; but it can be developed, if, as
Ruskin has emphasized earlier, the artist develops a pro
per attitude toward his subject matter.

This attitude is

love, which suppresses the artist's pride in self and tech
nique, things which obscure his powers of perceiving the
complexity and challenge of nature, or subject matter.
Lesser artists, considering only technique, make
a fundamental error when they study this duality of clarity
and obscurity in great art.

"Dull" artists mistake "the

mystery of great masters for carelessness, and their subtle
concealment of intention for want of intention."

Very

few people can perceive the "delicacy, invention, and
veracity" of Tintoretto or Reynolds.

Even though Reynolds

painted speedily, he rendered subtlety and tenderness in
his brush-strokes.
sources:

Obscurity can come from two different

*'lt is sometimes difficult to understand the

words of a deep thinker; but it is equally difficult to
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understand an idiot." The best thing that art students
can do is try neither for obscurity nor clarity as ends
in themselves:
Mean something, and say something, whenever you touch
canvas; yield neither to the affectation of precision
nor of speed, and trust to time, and your honest labour,
to invest your work gradually, in such measure and
kind as your genius can reach, with the tenderness
that comes of love, and the mystery that comes of power.
(VI, 86-87)
Noting the precise imitation of nature and its
complexity as revealed in great works of art is a frequent
admonishment of Ruskin.

He desires art students to study

only the greatest artists so that they can have a firm
grasp of what great art is.

With such knowledge and appre

ciation of greatest art, they will have a standard by which
they can judge not only their own work, but that of others.
By studying the works of Titian, Veronese, and Tintoretto,
young artists will become less concerned with passing fads
and theories and more concerned about the qualities of
these artist's works which have universal appeal.

Ruskin

recommends Reynolds and Turner as examples of modern artists
who paint in the manner, or with the intent, of the earlier
Venetian artists.

By studying the excellence of modern

artists, students will realize that great art is not
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attached to any period in time, but that it may be pro
duced in all times'and nations.

Ruskin hopes that the

English will produce art as great as that of the Venetians
(XVI, 314-18).
Studying a great painting calls for the same con
centration that studying nature does.
best example.

Ruskin is his own

In July, 1858, at the Turin gallery in Italy,

a visitor saw him examining Veronese's "The Queen of Sheba."
E. T. Cook quotes the visitor's account:
He was sitting all day upon a scaffold in the gal
lery, copying bits of the great picture by Paul Vero
nese, . . . One day ... I asked him to give me some
advice. He said, "Watch me." He then looked at the
flounce of a dress of a maid of honor of the Queen of
Sheba for five minutes, and then he painted one thread:
he looked for another five minutes, and then he painted
another thread. At the rate at which he was working
he might hope to paint the whole dress in ten years:
but it was a lesson as to examining what one drew well
before drawing it.
Such is the challenge of seeing nature clearly.
III. LOVE OF BEAUTY
Bot only must the artist desire to capture the
essence of his subject matter and reveal as many of its
^^The Life of John Ruskin, 2nd ed.
don, 1912), I, 521.

2 vols. (Lon
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natural truths as possible, he must also have a love of
beauty.

But, the artist's aesthetic sense must be linked

to his love of nature. That is, he must accept natural
beauty rather than try to artificially produce beauty ac
cording to formula or convention.

This idea is inherent

in Ruskin's stricture that beauty must be consistent with
truth.

He objects to either calling beauty truth, or truth

beauty, for this is a confusion of two distinct but related
ideas.

Worse, in the identification of beauty with truth,

beauty is pursued as a thing in itself, a practice which
results in the artificiality of beauty, a question of tech
nique only. Ruskin shows how the two terms are distinct
by saying that a statement like "two and two make four"
is true, "but it is neither beautiful nor ugly, for it
is invisible:
a rose is lovely, but it is neither true nor false,
for it is silent. That which shows nothing cannot
be fair, and that which asserts nothing cannot be
false. (V, 55n)
A work of art is true or false only when it purports to
state facts.

If a picture purports to show a man, dog,

or tree, but in fact doesn't, it is false.

When colors

and lines purport to resemble something they do not, then
they are false.

Normally, their beauty is independent of
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what they state.

But, they may be ugly when they faith

fully record ugly things:
a picture may be frightfully ugly, which represents
with fidelity some base circumstance of daily life;
and a painted window may be exquisitely beautiful,
which represents men with eagles' faces, and dogs with
blue heads and crimson tails. ... If this were not
so, it would be impossible to sacrifice truth to beauty;
for to attain the one would always be to attain the
other. (V, 55n)
The problem with the school of "high art" is that it pursues
beauty only.

Truth should be sought first, and then beauty

added, consistent with that truth.

What Ruskin is basical

ly doing is taking the middle, and more complex, ground be
tween the "high school" of art, the Formalists, who despise
nature, and the "low school," the Naturalists, who despise
symbolism.

Both of these schools fail to comprehend the

1 fi
wholeness of nature.-^"
Just as nature, or the artist's subject matter,
contains elements of clarity and obscurity, so, in terms
of beauty, nature has elements of good and evil, beauty
and ugliness.

These elements are so intertwined and fused

that to segregate them according to convention, formula,
or theory is to produce a false aspect of the world. The
artist's attitude toward his subject again enters as an
16ibid., I, 343.
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important consideration. He must subjugate himself in
deference to a desire to communicate truth.

Great art,

for example, in depicting a large gathering of people,
will not deny the facts of ugliness or decrepitude,
or relative inferiority and superiority of feature
as necessarily manifested in a crowd, but it will . . .
seek for and dwell upon the fairest forms, and in all
things insist on the beauty that is in them, not on
the ugliness. (V, 56)
What Ruskin calls false art "omits or changes all that is
ugly":
Great art accepts Nature as she is, but directs the
eyes and thoughts to what is most perfect in her;
false art saves itself the trouble of direction by
removing or altering whatever it thinks objectionable.
(V, 56-57)
There is a sense of balance to be maintained, it seems,
with the balance to be tipped slightly to the beautiful
aspects of nature.

When Ruskin calls for inclusion of

the ugly with the beautiful, he also places the burden
upon the author's skill in not allowing ugly features to
dominate the beautiful.
But as he criticizes the "high" school of art for
its inclusion of beautiful things only, he may appear to
emphasize ugliness.

He warns against this kind of pre

occupation, too. The greatest beauty comes from overcoming
fear of evil or ugly things in life and using them in art
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along with beauty. This the Greeks and Venetians did.
The next highest beauty, that of northern European art,
comes from not being able to conquer fear or evil, but
"remaining in melancholy war with it." Lowest art is so
conquered by evil that it unites with it and becomes sen
sual. Salvator's work has this quality (VII, 271).

The

artist's greatness is to be seen in this delicate treat
ment of the beautiful and ugly in nature.
This discussion also extends to the frank portrayal
of men.

Although man is God's chief work, and his best

art reveals him as such, nevertheless his full nature should
be rendered. To paint him as having either a spiritual
nature or an animal nature results from misunderstanding
man as he is:
For his nature is nobly animal, nobly spiritual-coherently and irrevocably so; neither part of it
may, but at its peril, expel, despise, or defy the
other. All great art confesses both. (VII, 264)
The single-minded pursuit of beauty results even
tually in the loss of it.

It is lost in two ways. First,

beauty is better appreciated when it has ugly elements
to set it off. To show sunshine, a painter must darken
his canvas in appropriate areas. Beauty "must be foiled
by inferiority before its own power can be developed."
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The art of Angelico, who paints spiritual subjects, "is
continually refreshed and strengthened by his frank por
traiture of the most ordinary features of his brother
monks." The schools of Raphael and the modern Germans,
however, depict only beautiful faces, straight noses, and
curled hair.

But, "Veronese opposes the dwarf to the

soldier, and the negress to the queen; Shakespeare places
Caliban beside Miranda ..." (V, 57).
The full range of beauty is also lost when it is
abstracted from one's subject:
The ugliest objects contain some element of beauty;
and in all it is an element peculiar to themselves,
which cannot be separated from their ugliness, but
must either be enjoyed together with it or not at all.
As the artist accepts nature as he finds it, he will dis
cover beauty where he thought only ugliness was (V, 58).
When beauty is divorced from its natural surround
ings, it becomes artificial and ugly. This is what happened
in the eighteenth century.

As people sought beauty in

artificial things, they were repelled by it. They "powdered
the hair, patched the cheek, and hooped the body." This
same kind of thinking resulted in brick walls and dim
pictures:

"Reaction from this state was inevitable. ..."

Men were repelled by this artificial beauty of city life
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to find the color, sweetness, light, and sense of liberty
in the country that they instinctively desired (V, 324).
The medieval ages are considered "Dark Ages," but
the art of modern times reveal that these are the dark
ages and medieval times were really brl^t.

Modern people

mechanically build their homes with brown bricks and clothe
themselves in brown coats (V, 321-22):
. , . whereas all the pleasure of the medieval was
in stability, definiteness, and luminousness, we are
expected to rejoice in darkness, and triumph in muta
bility. ... (V, 317)
Scott is an example of this modern flight from
artificial beauty.

He finds nature a unifying influence.

He regains a sense of the past which cities obscure.

He

finds liberty where flowers and vines grow freely, and he
finds the color, light, and variety of forms in nature
which city life has practically eliminated.

In nature

Scott, as all moderns, is able to discover and unify all
his various natural instincts (V, 345).
That beauty is artificial rather than instinctual
is a point upon which Ruskin criticizes Reynolds and those
who consider art from a technical standpoint only.

Beauty

has become so divorced from reference to nature that
Reynolds considers beauty a matter of custom rather than
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instinct. It is this same thinking that resulted in the
artificial beauty and eventual dullness from which men
flee to the country (V, 325).

Reynolds believes that if

people were used to deformity, they would consider it
beauty. Ruskin remonstrates:
But the world has never succeeded, nor ever will,
in making itself delight in black clouds more than
blue sky, or love the dark earth better than the rose
that grows from it. . . . The most subtle reasoner
will . . . find that colour and sweetness are still
attractive to him, and that no logic will enable him
to think the rainbow sombre or the violet scentless.
(V, 44-45)
Part of Reynolds' problem is that he instirictively
paints beauty, but when he tries to rationalize this in
stinct, he errs:
For nearly every word that Reynolds wrote was contrary
to his own practice; ... he enforced with his lips
generalization and idealism, while with his pencil he
was tracing the patterns of the dresses of the belles
of his day; ... he denied the existence of the beauti
ful, at the same instant that he arrested it as it
passed, and perpetuated it forever. (V, 46)
Ruskin goes on to explain why Reynolds' performance
varies with his pronouncements:
ize an instinct is natural.

The ten^tation to rational

It is most evident when people

sense degrees of beauty in works of art, and they try to
explain to themselves and others why one work seems more
beautiful than another. This tendency is good; one should
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know why he likes certain works of art, but too frequently
he tries to find the source of beauty in technique, some
thing which lends itself more to rationalization than does
the subtle communication of the artist's experience, which
may be the actual source of beauty. Thus, concrete stand
ards become formulated which do not conform to the real
reasons why some artists seem greater than others, or, as
in Reynolds* case, why he succeeds in painting beauty
(V, 46). In addition to Reynolds* theory that great art
differs from low art in terms of details, there are theories
which state that the bigger in size a picture is, the
"greater** it is. Another theory is that nude bodies make
for greater art than clothed ones.

A third is that the

artist must never have seen what he paints, that only the
past presents great subjects.

A last erroneous theory is

that painting must improve upon God's work (V, 46-47).
In the light of what has already been said about Ruskin's
feeling as to the artist's attitude toward nature or sub
ject matter, it is easy to see why Ruskin would consider
this last theory erroneous.

The effect of such intellec-

tualizing is that it ignores the fact that men have a
natural sense of beauty, and that great artists transfer
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beauty from nature to canvas or page through this sense.
As a result, this rationalizing ironically produces such
false and unreasonable theories as those above.
Beauty must be consistent with truth not only in
showing the ugly in nature and the animal in man, it should
also ally "higher" nature with "lower" nature.
aspect of the world should be isolated.

Neither

For example, the

statues on the exterior of the Cathedral of Chartres closely
associate "the beauty of lower nature in animals and flowers,
with the beauty of higher nature in human form. . . . Greek
statues are always isolated; blank fields of stone, or
depths of shadow, relieving the form of the statue. ..."
By contrast, the clothed statue of Chartres seems to be
the type of the Christian spirit--in many respects
feebler and more contracted--but purer; clothed in
its white robes and crown, and with the riches of all
creation at its side. (XVI, 280)
Evident in this passage is Ruskin's admiration of the
Christian sculptor's devotion to his subject matter, his
desire to communicate the wholeness of man's existence
from spiritual to floral, beauty consistent with truth.
An artist with this frame of mind can bring true beauty
even into "lower" forms of art, such as furniture, dishes,
and clothing, even though these items may not be considered
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relevant to natural fact. Yet, Giotto, Ctellini, Holbein,
and Michael Angelo all worked in these art forms as well
as in the higher forms. Their regard for natural fact
can be seen in these "lower" works (XVI, 288).
IV. INVENTION
For all of Ruskin's emphasis upon the artist's
attitude toward his subject, he is not discounting the
role of the artist's imagination in producing great art.
As a matter of fact, this element is the most important
in Ruskin's art theory.

Even though nature must be thor

oughly perceived in all her complexity, there is room for
the operation of the imagination.

True perception of nature

is only a starting point, a foundation, for young artists.
They must concentrate on exact reproduction:
Then, when their memories are stored and their imagina
tions fed, and their hands firm, let them take up the
scarlet and the gold, give reins to their fancy, and
show us what their heads are made of.^^
There are two steps in the production of great art:
First, the observation of facts; secondly, the mani
festing of human design and authority in the way that
fact is told. Great and good art must unite the two,
^^Quoted in E. T. Cook, "Ruskin as an Artist and
Art Critic," The Studio, XIX (March, 1900), 91.

61
it cannot exist for a moment but in their unity. . . .
(XVI, 269-270)
For these reasons Ruskin will accept a photograph because
of its exact reproduction of nature.

But, he does not

see photography as a supplement or substitute for a paint
ing because it omits the second step, at least in photo
graphy's current stage of development.
Invention is the term Ruskin uses to describe the
operation of the imagination, and it acts in two ways.
It either "entirely imagines its subject, or it arranges
the materials presented to it" (V, 63). In both cases,
however, the artist is able to conceive his subject in
its entirety:

". . . partial conception is no conception.

The whole picture must be imagined, or none of it is"
(VII, 243).
Just as the artist must submerge his ego to per
ceive truly his subject matter, so he must continue this
abnegation of the self in deference to this image that
his invention presents to him. The qualities that Ruskin
sees important in the artist for this condition to exist
have moral value. To be true to the image in his mind,
the artist must control his feelings, even though strong
feeling is a necessity.

Excessive emotion destroys
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fidelity to the invented image.

A calmness of mind is

necessary to maintain the image; therefore no vain or sel
fish person can paint nobly;

"Vanity and selfishness are

troublous, eager, anxious, petulant. ..." Further, the
calmness must be natural; it cannot be forced.

Rubens,

Velasquez, Titian, and Veronese were all calm and unhurried
as they painted the images in their minds.
be shallow or petty, either;

An artist cannot

"Mere cleverness or special

gift never made an artist. It is only perfectness of mind,
unity, depth, decision, the highest qualities, in fine,
of the intellect, which will form the imagination."

Finally,

"no false person can paint." He cannot perceive the whole
ness of truth, only parts of it:
It Is only the constant desire of, and submissiveness
to truth, which can measure its strange angles and
mark its infinite aspects; and fit them and knit them
into the strength of sacred invention. (VII, 249-50)
To transfer the invented image from the mind to the canvas
is a delicate and complex act requiring far more than mere
conscious effort.

In calling invention a sacred quality,

Ruskin says only an act of worship produces inventive art.
Needless to say, attention to technique or conven
tion merely gets in the way. The artist who has no invention
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is always setting things in order, and putting the
world to rights, and mending, and beautifying, and
pluming himself on his doings as supreme in all ways.
(V, 125)
Not only do great artists work without following rules,
but the power of an artist is inversely proportional to
his following rules or principles. (V, 122)
The first quality of invention, that of entirely
imagining the subject, would seem to contradict Ruskin's
stricture for a prior observance of nature as she is before
using the imagination.

This idea would be true were it

not for the fact that visions in the mind are a kind of
"inner" nature as opposed to the outer nature Ruskin is
talking about.

Basically, it has to do with man's religious

sense; "sight of faith" is Ruskin's alternative term.
Because it involves the same suppression of ego and tech
nique that the true observance of outer nature calls for,
Ruskin approves of it, although he holds it on a level
below that of working from eyesight.

Examples of this

treatment of inner nature in art are seen in Ruskin's dis
cussions of the "purist idealists" and the "grotesque
idealists." The problem with the purist idealists is that
they "shrink" from the everyday evils that are a part of
external nature. They "endeavor to create for themselves
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an imaginary state, in which pain and imperfection either
do not exist, or exist in some edgeless and infeebled con
dition." They draw everything "without shadows, as if
the sun were everywhere at once."

Although a modern

artist knows better, these artists who lived in the thir
teenth century did not.

They were honestly expressing

their personal spiritual affections and hopes.

Angelico

is an example. As a monk, his life was devoted to imagin
ing the spiritual world.

The exemplary qualities instilled

in him enabled him to excel in expressing "the sacred af
fections upon the human countenance." Further, he gave
the best idea of spiritual beings.

Although he is a true

idealist, nevertheless he is not a master of his art.
He did not paint the truth of experience (V, 103-105).
The grotesque idealists demonstrate inventive power
in their rendition of fictional beings.

Although these

artists have never seen such creatures, nevertheless their
imaginations present them to them so strongly that the
image is equivalent to eyesight. To illustrate his point,
Ruskin compares the "true" griffin of a Lombard workman
to a "false" griffin of a classical sculptor who worked
according to convention.

Because the Lombard saw his
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griffin in his imagination so vividly, he succeeded not
only in combining the physical features of a lion and eagle,
but he also conveyed the essence of the lion and eagle.
He managed to combine the rather indolent bulk of the lion
with the streamlined alertness of the eagle.

This sculp-

tored griffin, in its massiveness, supports a pillar re
sulting in harmony between function and conception.

The

classical griffin, however, is merely omamental. The
natural forms of lion and eagle are distorted to make the
figure fit inside the boundaries of a frieze. The result
is an unbelievable figure, rather than one that just might
have existed (V, 145-47).
The second function of invention, that of arranging
the materials seen in outer nature, is more important than
visions of the mind because it relates the viewer more to
the world. There is common ground between artist and view
er, so meaningful communication can take place. For this
reason Ruskin makes evidence of imagination in a work of
art the criterion of excellence. It is upon this basis
that he draws the distinction between "poetical" and "his
torical" art in preference to such technical considerations
as variable or invariable detail:
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. . . to create anything in reality is to put life
into it.
A poet, or creator, is therefore a person who
puts things together, not as a watchmaker steel, or
a shoemaker leather, but who puts life into them.
His work is essentially this: it is the gathering
and arranging of material by imagination, so as to
have in it at last the harmony or helpfulness of life,
and the passion or emotion of life. (VII, 215)
Raskin defines poetry in the same manner that he
defines great painting.

It results when the poet imagina

tively assembles facts of experience ("noble grounds")
to give rise to "noble emotions." Such emotions would
be "Love, Veneration, Admiration, and [unselfish] Joy,"
and the opposite emotions--"Hatred, Indignation . . .,
Horror, and Grief. ..." The "noble grounds" for these
emotions must be "large as well as just." For example,
indignation is poetic when caused by serious injury, but
not when one is cheated out of his money.

But, the imagina

tion must furnish the grounds of these emotions.
has poetical feeling, or the noble emotions:

Everyone

"But, the

power of assembling, by the help of the imag:ination, such
images as will excite these feelings, is the power of the
poet or literally of the 'Maker'" (V, 28-29).

It is im

possible, then, for a writer without invention to tell what
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tools a true poet will make use of or how he will use them:
"It is vain to say that the details of poetry ought to
possess, or ever do possess, any definite character"
(V, 30).
Invention also plays a role in purely historical
art as well. There are high and low orders of history in
terms of the importance of the facts themselves,
so that what with difference of subject, and what with
difference of treatment, historical painting falls
or rises in changeful eminence, from Dutch trivialities
to a Velasquez portrait, just as historical talking
or writing varies in eminence, from an old woman's
story-telling up to Herodotus.
When the imagination, or invention, enters in terms of
the writer's commentary or arrangement of details, then
the line between poetry and history may disappear.

Yet,

these two modes of writing should not be confused (V, 64).
Although historical art becomes higher as the imagination
plays a greater role, the highest art is purely imagina
tive, "all its materials being wrought into their form
by invention. ..." As this "highest" art must deal with
facts of experience, it includes historical art:

"for

all imagination must deal with the knowledge it has before
accumulated; it never produces anything but by combination
or contemplation" (V, 65).

Further, excellent historical
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art requires the same negation of self necessary to poeti
cal art.

After studying historical facts carefully, the

artist lets "these truths . . . rise up and form the body
of his imaginative vision. ..." He must then be able
to "quit his own personality, and enter . . . into the
hearts and thoughts of each person" (V, 124-25).
Art which fulfills Ruskin's requirements of first
observing nature closely, leaving nothing out, and then
applying the inventive powers to arrange the subject matter
is called "naturalist ideal" art.

It accepts "the weak

nesses, faults, and wrongnesses in all things that it sees,
and it so places them and harmonizes them that they form
a noble whole." For this reason this art is "that central
and highest branch of ideal art" (V, 111).
is one example.

Shakespeare

He "sees the truth wholly, and neither

desires nor dares to mutilate it."

He places Falstaff

opposite his Prince Henry, Shallow opposite Falstaff, and
Cordelia opposite Regan (V, 112-13). Homer is a naturalist
idealist in that he shows imperfections or lownesses in
perfect elements, such as Achilles cutting pork chops:
For it is to be kept in mind that the naturalist ideal
has always in it, to the full, the power expressed by
those two words. It is naturalist, because studied
from nature, and ideal, because it is mentally arranged
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in a certain manner. Achilles must be represented cut
ting pork chops, because that was one of the things
which the nature of Achilles involved his doing: he
could not be shown wholly as Achilles, if he were not
shown doing that. But he shall do it at such time and
place as Homer chooses. (V, 113)
Linking the imagination to the facts of nature,
or experience, is so important because the imagination can
obscure nature as easily as the pursuit of technique can.
When the imagination and technique become linked, then
reality is totally obscured.

No message about experience

can be communicated, and the consequences have far-flung
effects, especially in modern times.

This idea lies behind

Ruskin's warning in The Two Paths that when artificiality
sets in as a result of ignoring nature, either through
mere ornam,entation or following artistic rules,
there is but one word for you--Death:--death of every
healthy faculty, and of every noble intelligence, in
capacity of understanding one great work that man has
ever done, or of doing anything that it shall be help
ful for him to behold. (XVI, 289)
A noble person observes nature and the world "full in the
face," understands these deeply and calmly deals with them.
In so doing he furthers the good and reduces evil.

The

"ignoble" person, however, does not clearly see nature and
the world for what they are.

Understanding nothing, he is

"swept away by the trampling torrent, and unescapable force"
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of unforeseen and misunderstood things (XVI, 287).
The sociological implications become evident when
Ruskin describes the modern mind in terms of its ignoring
fact and pursuing imaginary things. The preoccupations
of a society becomes evident in their art and lives, and
Ruskin sees these preoccupations in terms of the ignoble
person.
Modern people do not follow their "proper business"
in the world, which are:

to know themselves and what in

life they must deal with; to be happy with themselves and
the world; and to improve themselves and the world. They
remain ignorant, unhappy, and indolent because they do
not face disagreeable facts.

Instead, they become "a

species of instinctive terror at all truth" and they love
"glosses, veils, and decorative lies of every sort."
Further, they have "a general readiness to take delight
in anything past, future, far off, or somewhere else,
rather than in things now, near, and here." For these
reasons they pursue what Ruskin calls a "false ideal" in
art and literature.
tions (V, 71).

In doing so they abuse their imagina
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In the development of this false ideal in art,
Ruskin traces the separation of the imagination from nature,
and its alliance with technique to form "ideal beauty,"
or false beauty. This separation first took place in the
vision-making aspect of invention, when artists began to
paint religious imagery without believing in it.

In the

thirteenth century this imagery "consisted merely in sim
ple outlines and pleasant colours, which were understood
to be nothing more than signs of the thing thought of.
. . ." It only suggested the idea, and the viewer "went
on to form truer images for himself" (V, 73).

For example,

a symbolic depiction of the Nativity appeared in the Bible,
and the reader was not distracted from the text.

He saw

it only as illustrating the meaning of such words as "wrapped
Him in swaddling clothes, and laid Him in a manger" (V, 74).
It is important to note that the symbolism is subordinate
to the experience that is to be conveyed.

Symbolic presen

tation is not pursued as a thing in itself; the only reason
exact reproduction is impossible is because technical skill
is not developed.

But, when skilled artists "with exquisite

power of representing the human form, and high knowledge
of the H^rsteries of art, devoted all their skill to the
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delineation of an impossible scene," then people's attention
was attracted to the art itself.

The Madonna appeared as

queenly lady, her dress embroidered with gold, and
with a crown of jewels upon her hair, kneeling, on
a floor of inlaid and precious marble, before a crowned
child, laid under a portico of Lombardic architecture;
with a sweet, verduous, and vivid landscape in the
distance, full of winding rivers, village spires, and
baronial towers. . . . the continual presentment to
the mind of this beautiful . . . imagery . . . chilled
its power of apprehending the real truth. . . . (V, 75)
The real truth is that the Madonna was "a plain Jewish
girl."
These early Christian artists, however, genuinely
believed they were worshipping the Madonna and Christ when
they painted the Nativity in a glorified manner.

They were

trying to express "the enthusiastic state" of their own
feelings about the fact.

Such an artist

covers the Virgin's dress with gold, not with any idea
of representing the Virgin as she ever was, . . . but
with a burning desire to show what his love and
reverence would think fittest for her. (V, 76)
These "purist idealists," like the writers who commit the
pathetic fallacy, are not condemned by Ruskin in their
representing other than actual fact.

He sees both groups

proceeding from a genuine state of mind, a result of psy
chological truth, religious faith in the former and emotion
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in the latter.

It is interesting to point out that these

two groups are on opposite sides of the religious coin
as far as Ruskin is concerned, but he accepts both their
work. The purist idealists depart from factual representa
tion by great faith; the committers of the pathetic fallacy
err by no faith.

The saving factor in both groups is their

lack of calculation or pursuit of technique in their work.
They perform according to what genuinely lies in their
minds.
When these religious artists, however, did turn
their attention to technique instead recording early Christ
ian experience or elaborating their faith, then a complete
separation between imagination and experience was effected:
"In early times art was employed for the display of reli
gious facts; now, religious facts were employed for the
display of art" (V, 77). The Madonna, for example, was
seen only with a mechanical eye
as an available subject for the display of transparent
shadows, skillful tints, and scientific foreshortenings,--as a fair woman, forming, if well painted, a
pleasant piece of furniture for the corner of a bou
doir. ... It was thus that Raphael thought of the
Madonna. (V, 78)
With the imagination dazzled by technique, reli
gious faith faded into the background.

This pursuit of
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ideal beauty, or the false ideal, brought secular, or "pro
fane" art, into existence:
as long as men sought for truth first, and beauty
secondarily, they cared . . . for the chief truth,
and all art was instinctively religious. But as soon
as they sought for beauty first, and truth secondarily,
they were punished by losing sight of spiritual truth
altogether, and the profane . . . schools of art were
instantly developed. (V, 91)
%

The imagination became so far removed from fact of exper
ience that it dealt with fictitious subject matter in which
the artist did not believe.

"Heathen" mythology supplied

examples for artists who discarded the robes of subjects
in religious art to display the "nobility of nakedness"
of the human form.

Ruskin notes how this pursuit of false

ideal beauty led to an extreme:
Formerly, though they attempted to reach an un
natural beauty, it was yet in representing historical
facts and real persons; now they sought for the same
unnatural beauty in representing tales they knew to
be fictitious, and personages who, they knew, had never
existed. Such a state of things had never before been
found in any nation. . . . The ideal art of modern
Europe was the shadow of a shadow; and, with mechanism
substituted for perception, and bodily beauty for
spiritual life, it set itself to represent men it
had never seen, customs it had never practised, and
gods in whom it had never believed. (V, 92-93)
Vices became depicted because virtue lay only in displaying
truth. Subject matter became brutal or sensual.

Battle

slaughters, orgies, "grotesque fiends," and "picturesque
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infernos" were depicted.

More seriously3 Biblical and myth

ological forms were used to flatter important people in
their portraits (V, 93).
As stated earlier, this separation between the
imagination and experience, or "truth," has broad negative
sociological effects. The inventive powers of the imagina
tion create an unreal vision of the world. Men make a
mistake when they try to ignore the evil and misery that
is coexistent with the good. In the midst of God's beauty.
He also provides a warning:
. . . this I know . . . that no good or lovely thing
exists in this world without its correspondent dark
ness; and that the universe presents itself continually
to mankind under the stern aspect of warning, or of
choice, the good and the evil set on the right hand
and the left. (VI, 416)
But, like the early Christians, some modern artists
tend to ignore the effect that "the elements of decay,
danger, and grief in visible things" have on people's lives.
Believing that all would turn out good in the attainment
of Heaven despite life's problems, such artists gloss over
the true depths such problems have in hu^n life:
It may perhaps be thought that this Is a very high and
right state of mind.
Unfortunately, it appears that th,e attainment of
it is never possible without inducing some form of
intellectual weakness. (VIII, 267)
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Men, especially artists and writers, should not
be content to look at "the bright side" of things because
of religious optimism. To do so results in ignoring the
actual effects of evil and blinds them from perhaps helping
others.

God has given man two sides, and He has "intended

us to see both." A Scotch clergyman, for example, rhapsodically describes a Highland scene as evidence of God's
work. Ruskin has also seen such a view, but it included
the carcass of an ewe rotting in a stream with oily waters.
Further down the stream a man and boy were fishing:

"a

picturesque and pretty group ... if they had not been
there all day starving" (VII, 267-69).
The fact is that natural beauty, such as that of
mountains, has no aesthetic relationship to the lives of
the people living on their slopes and in their valleys.
One may think that there is "innocence and peace, and
fellowship of the human soul with nature.

It is not so."

These people know nothing of beauty or knowledge and little
of virtue. They live hard lives, gleaning a bare existence
from the rocky soil;
For them, there is neither hope nor passion of spirit;
for them neither advance nor exhultation. Black bread,
rude roof, dark night, laborious day, weary arm at
sunset; and life ebbs away.
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Paradoxically, English cottages, situated in "dull flat
fields and uninteresting hedgerows" are neat and cheerfullooking due to "energy of heart, and happiness in the simple
course and simple possessions of daily life."

But, the

mountain cottage, amidst "inconceivable, inexpressible
beauty" is a "dark and plague-like stain" on the landscape
(VI, 388-89).
In contrast to this reality, this truth of nature,
rich London and Parisian play-goers pursue the false ideal
when they watch idealized plays which show mountain people
as being cheerful, carefree, and happy:
If all the gold that has gone to paint the simulcra
of the cottages, and to put new songs in the mouths
of the simulcra of the peasants, had gone to brighten
the existent cottages, and to put new songs into the
mouths of the existent peasants, it might in the end,
perhaps, have turned out better so, not only for the
peasants but for even the audience. (VI, 390)
This pursuit of the false ideal occurs in literature
as well. People succeed in allowing their imaginations to
obscure natural truth, the consequence of which is that
nothing is done to cure social ills. People instead follow
the "vagaries of their minds." They read "senseless fic
tions" instead of the "real human histories" around them.
They pursue "romantic historical deceptions," or they "take
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pleasure" in "fanciful portraits of rural or romantic life
in poetry and on the stage, without the smallest effort
to rescue the living rural population . . . from its ignor
ance or misery" (V, 100-101).
This modern pursuit of false ideal beauty, as op
posed to beauty that is both naturalist and ideal, causes
men to shun even the present. They go to their imaginations
which reveal to them the beauty of their ancestors and of
the past in general. Ruskin notes a contradiction in modern
life in regard to the past that did not exist in older
societies:

we say we've surpassed the accomplishments

of the past, yet we long for a past way of life. The older
societies valued their accomplishments, but they did not
desire a past way of life:

"The Greeks and medievals

honoured, but did not imitate their forefathers; we imitate,
but do not honour" (V, 325).
Great art, to Ruskin, is not defineable in terms
of technique, but rather in terms of the mental make-up
of the artist, especially in his ignoring technique or
convention in preference to seeing accurately the essence
of his experience.

All aspects of man are utilized in

producing great art:
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For as (1) the choice of the high subject involves
all conditions of right moral choice [through negation
of the self], and as (2) the love of beauty involves
all conditions of right admiration [evil with good,
ugly with beautiful], and as (3) the grasp of truth
involves all strength of sense, evenness of judgment,
and honesty of purpose [to show nature as she is],
and as (4) the poetical power involves all swiftness
of invention, and accuracy of historical memory, the
sum of all these powers is the sum of the human soul.
Hence, the word "Great" applies to such art.

All lower

art calls forth only part of the human spirit (V, 65-66),
and this is the problem with modern art and society.

All

these qualities are necessary for a true communication
between artist and viewer to take place.

And, it is the

difficulty of attaining all these qualities that renders
consideration of technique an insignificant, or at best,
an interfering, matter.
The complexity of stating the different sides of
great art as a product of the soul, or whole man, lay at
the bottom of Ruskin's apparent contradictions in Modern
Painters I and II.

Found among his papers after his death

was a statement intended for addition to some material
in Stones of Venice.

This statement reveals his realization

of why error and contradiction had been attributed to him.
The problem was his trying to express art principles broadly;
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yet, in doing so, he opened himself to dual interpretations
of what he had said about fact against design in art:
It was assumed that all great . . . art was essen
tially Ideal or of the Soul, as distinguished from the
lower art which is principally the body. . . . There
is not a definite separation between the two kinds. . . .
Only exactly in proportion as the Soul is thrown into
it, the art becomes Fine; and not in proportion to any
amount of practice, ingenuity, strength, knowledge,
or other calculable and saleable excellence thrown
into it. . . . This one truth I have throughout had
at my heart--variously struggling and endeavoring to
illustrate it--according to the end immediately in
view.
Yet, even though the Soul must be added, not all
great artists possess all the elements in equal degree.
Some may be more inventive, and others tend more to the
realistic aspects. It is these contradictory or inde
pendent elements that cause people to rank great artists.
But, one artist is not greater or lesser than another be
cause he tends one way or the other.

The fact that all

the elements are present renders him great (V, 66-67).
An example is Titian, who unifies all these elements of
the soul so delicately that different people see different
things in his art, although not to the degree they would
like.

Sensualists find sensuality in him, thinkers, thought;
^^Quoted in Cook, The Life of John Ruskin, I, 341-42.
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saints, sanctity; colorists, color; and anatomists, form.
A Titian picture is never overwhelmingly popular, because
no one element dominates.

Lesser painters, with dominant

qualities, are loudly praised. Yet a deep murmur persists
through the centuries and this timeless, quiet approval
attests to his greatness (XVI, 297-98).

CHAPTER III
GREATNESS IN SOCIETY
Raskin's social criticism parallels his art criti
cism.

As he attacks the "lifeless conventions of contem

porary art," so he attacks the materialistically-oriented
doctrines of the political economists.^

The idea of an

"Economic Man." is as repulsive to him as the idea of an
"Aesthetic Man."

He is trying to establish a link between

art and common life on the one hand and economics and com
mon life on the other. He sees the esthete and the philistine as each pursuing one half of the total life.

The

economist, in his emphasis upon theory, and the esthete,
in his emphasis upon convention or technique, both neglect
nature, or experience.

Neither considers that greatness

is not possible in either art or society unless the human
soul's preeminence becomes recognized.
t

Frederick W. Roe, The Social Philosophy of Carlyle
and Ruskin (New York, 1921), p. 170.
«•

.

John D. Rosenberg, The Darkening Glass;
of Ruskin's Genius (New York, 1961), p. 21.
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A Portrait

Although there is not an exact correspondence be
tween the qualities necessary for great art and those nec
essary for greatness in a society, nevertheless Ruskin
calls for basically the same manner of thinking.

What

he calls for in society is the same negation of self that
he calls for in art.

In society, however, the self is

to defer to the promotion of human life in an educational
and cultural as well as material sense. Humanity replaces
nature in Ruskin's social criticism.
For this deference to take place, the qualities
men need are faith, affection, unselfishness, and coopera
tion.

All these qualities are nearly identical, but they

progress from purely spiritual matters to specific social
actions.

Further, they are a recognition of man's soul

as the key to a society's greatness, just as the presence
of the soul is necessary for great art.
I. FAITH
Much of Ruskin's criticism of modern art centers
around its testimony to man's loss of faith.

In a like

manner, he sees the darkness and sadness of modern society
as the result of this faithlessness. Savages, he says,
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have more belief in a divinity than cultured Europeans.
Those who do believe are divided into Romanists and Puri
tans, who wish only to destroy each other. This division
"between persons nominally of one religion" has "become
a stumbling block ... to all thoughtful and far-sighted
men. . . .
Hence, nearly all our powerful men . . . are unbelievers;
the best of them in doubt and misery; the worst in reck
less defiance; the plurality, in plodding hesitation,
doing, as well as they can, what practical work lies
ready to their h a n d s . . . .
In politics, religion is now a name; in art, a
hypocrisy or affectation. . . . All sincere and modest
art is . . . profane.^
Scott is an example of this faithlessness, or at best "wa
vering belief."

He is a Presbyterian only because he lives

in Edinburgh, Scotland:
He thinks Romanism more picturesque, and profaness
more gentlemanly; does not see that anything affects
human life but love, courage, and destiny; . . . not
matters of faith . . . , but of sight. (V, 336)
Scott considers religion only as a matter of form, which
is the same sort of thinking that Ruskin sees fatal in art.
^!he Works of John Ruskin, ed. E. T. Cook and
Alexander Wedderburn, Library Edition, 39 vols. (London,
1903-1912), V, 322-323. Reference to this edition will
be by volmae and page number, and will be included in
the text.
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As a result there is a dichotomy in English society
between professed religion and a conscious "disobedience
of its first principles" as national policy.

Christianity

condemns the love of money and the desire for material
things, but "we forthwith investigate a science of becoming
rich as the shortest road to national prosperity" (XVII,
75-76). This dichotomy brings confusion and paradox into
church doctrine.

Churches preach that one must war against

the "world." Ruskin wonders if this is the same world
as the one people are to "get on in." The Bible inveighs
against spiritual evil in the world but not against the
world itself:

"God loved the world . . Christ is the light

of it." On Judgment Day, the Bible says, men will not
leave this world, but God's kingdom will come to it (VII,
457-59).
This unification between God and the earth takes
place in man. Man's soul is the image of God, and it has,
from the beginning, reflected Him.

It has never changed,

although it has been defiled:
We are not made now in any other image than God's.
There are, indeed, the two states of this image-the earthly and heavenly, but both Adamite, both
human, both the same likeness; only one defiled,
and one pure. So that the soul of man is still a
mirror, wherein may be seen, darkly, the image of
the mind of God. (VII, 260)
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II. AFFECTION
But, separation between spiritual and material
concerns, between belief and practice, is a result of loss
of faith, and so man's nature is divided as well.

Atten

tion to his soul is ignored, while attention to his body,
as an economic tool, dominates.

Unbelief in God, then,

results in an unbelief in humanity. People adopt the idea
that man is a brute, that "all motive force in him is es
sentially brutish, covetous, or contentious." But, man
is never motivated by these things, but rather by love and
trust. The greatest scientific discoveries and artistic
works were not done for pay at all. This belief that man
is a brute has led to the wrong ways of getting men to
work. Large amounts of money have not brought significant
results.

Only love and trust extended to the able will

bring results (VII, 448-52).
The problem with the political economists is that
they dissociate social action from "social affection."
They call the social affections "accidental and disturbing
elements in human nature; but avarice and the desire of
progress are constant elements." They wish to eliminate
the "inconstant" affections and to consider man as merely

87
a "covetous machine" in order to determine how the greatest
amount of material wealth can be obtained. Then the var
iable "affectionate element" may be added to determine,
as each individual wishes, the result of the new conditions.
But, the affections are not a quantitative, but a qualita
tive element.

They do not simply become an addition to

the "constant" factors, but they alter these factors.
Therefore, a social science which proceeds without taking
the affections into consideration becomes as inapplicable
to reality as a science of gymnastics which discounts the
human skeleton. To alter the human form and then to try
to reinsert the skeleton renders such a process ludicrous.
As such a science ignore's man's skeleton, so the current
science of political economy ignores man's soul and sup
poses that man is all skeleton (XVII, 25-27).
The inapplicability of economic theory, as it
exists, to reality or experience, can be seen in current
workmen's strikes, a situation which the economists are
powerless to solve.

The reason for these strikes is that

workers and masters believe that because their interests
differ, they must be against each other.

If both sides

would consider the work that must be done, then they would
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not be so antagonistic.

The question of whether or not

their interests differ is pointless.

What must regulate

their relationship is a sense of justice. This sense of
justice must be based upon the "affections as one man owes
to another" (XVII, 28).
These affections issue out of man's soul, and it
is the negation of the soul as man's chief motive power
that renders the economic theories nugatory.

Man cannot

be treated or theorized about as if he were a machine,
because only one part of his true nature is considered.
This idea of man's soul "enters into all the political
economists' equations . . . and falsifies . . . their re
sults" (XVII, 29).
If affection governs the relationship between worker
and master, then more material benefits occur for the mas
ter. The good that a worker renders will exceed material
concerns in "protective watchfulness of his master's in
terest and credit," and in "joyful readiness to seize un
expected and irregular occasions of help" (XVII, 30).
The role of the affections in the worker here is analogous
to that of the devotion of the artist toward his subject
matter. The removal of material, or technical concerns.
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in both cases results in increased effort toward accomplish
ing the goal:

good art from the artist, better production

from the worker.

Ruskin's idea that work is good and not

an evil to be shunned, runs counter to the assumptions
of the political economists. From his observance of art,
the professions, and handicrafts, he early realized that
wages are not the only incentives to work.^
Ruskin's mode of inquiry along these lines has
led to its being termed basically scientific, rather than
merely sentimental.

But, Derrick Leon points out that

his mind went beyond mere scientific inqsairy, it
went beyond the "merely rational horizon," and by the
vision of categorical truth thus got was guided by
a deeper understanding of facts and their laws, than
is possible to a Darwin, a Huxley or a Metchnikoff.
. . . The tendency of Victorian science was to prove
man a mechanism: whereas the whole of Ruskin's work
went to show that this was precisely what he was not-and could not become, without disaster to soul and
body, individual and race.^
Huskin*s economic criticism is not limited to
worker-master relationships only.

He considers the rela

tionship between the rich and the poor, the broader aspect
^John A. Hobson, John Ruskin, Social Reformer
(Boston, 1898), pp. 79-80.
^Ruskin:
pp. 276-277.

The Great Victorian (London, 1949),
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of the worker-master relationship. The "captains of in
dustry" must consider the effects of their activities on
other people.

The kind of mind "which pursues its own

interests at any cost of life" is deplorable, even if the
evil caused is unintended.

An intentional evil act shows

that the doer knows right from wrong.

But pursuing one's

own economic way, ignorant of the hardships caused, is
a worse state of mind (XVI, 405). The reason that such
ignorance is deplorable is that the actor must first be
convinced that he is responsible for a condition for which
he does not feel responsible.

The mere suggestion of

change may be regarded as an insult, hardening him all
the more in his self-satisfaction.
To be relevant, the science of political economy
must therefore cease its teaching that the sole concern
of men is how to get rich, and also consider that as some
men get rich, others get poor (XVII, 43-44).

Once people

realize this fact, then they will carefully consider the
justice with which their wealth is obtained, rather than
consider quantity only.

Wealth accumulated through just

actions signifies a general prosperity, since no one has
been cheated or mistreated.

If gotten unjustly, then "that
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which seems to be wealth may ... be only the gilded in
dex of far-reaching ruin ..." (XVII, 53).

It is not

enough to "buy in the cheapest market and sell in the
dearest." Rather, one must see why the one market is
cheap, and the other is dear.

No person can know all

this; he can only know if his own transactions are "just
and faithful" (XVII, 53-54).
But, the rich will come face-to-face with the
poor. This is as much a natural fact as streams flowing
into the ocean. How the rich and poor interact depends
on the justness with which the poor are treated.

Yet,

justice is the very thing that the rich are most hesitant
to give (XVII, 59-60).

They prey upon the poor, instead.

The reason crime and misery exist is the misapprehension
of one truth, that "a certain quantity of work is necessary
to produce a certain quantity of good. ..." The rich,
however, try to get their needs for nothing or on the
efforts of others.
Instead of helping others overcome difficulties,
the rich use these difficulties to advantage.

For example,

if, due to distress, poor producers must sell at less than
full value, the rich take advantage of them (XVI, 396).
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The poor need more than material things, however:
The life is more than the meat. The rich not only
refuse food to the poor; they refuse wisdom; they re
fuse virtue; they refuse salvation. (XVII, 107)
To help bring these more important intangibles to the poor
working classes, Ruskin taught at the Working Men's Col
lege, which was to make available to the working classes,
as Edward T. Cook says, "the same kind of education that
the upper classes enjoyed:
It saw in education a means of life as well as of
livelihood. It sought not to help working-men to
"get on" and "rise out of their class," but to im
prove themselves by satisfying the needs of their
mental and spiritual natures."
Material advancement is not Ruskin's purpose in his social
criticism. People must seek only to be happy in the world
rather than rise in it. They must resolve
to seek--not greater wealth, but simpler pleasure;
not higher fortune, but deeper felicity; making the
first of possessions, self-possession; and honoring
themselves in the harmless pride and calm pursuits
of peace. (XVII, 112)
Such statements give Ruskin's ideas a paradoxical
appearance--calling for better treatment of the poor, yet
denying them the same right to property that the rich have.
C.

Edward T. Cook, The Life of John Ruskin, 2nd ed.
2 vols. (London, 1912), I, 378.
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This appearance comes from Ruskin's looking through simple
material concerns to the deeper needs of men.

His penetra

tive imagination, as it perceives men's hearts and discerns
their true motivating force, brings the realization that
simple recognition of their humanity, and treatment accord
ingly, is what makes them happy:

"The life is more than

the meat." There is a middle ground between stagnation
and revolution, and Ruskin seeks this ground.

Therefore,

as Cook says.
He was a Republican as against institutions or laws
which oppressed the poor; and a conservative as against
theories and reforms which were based on doctrines of
liberty and equality.
Ruskin cannot be called a socialist, because he
fears division of property like he fears every other form
of division. The rich do not deprive the poor by merely
having property, but rather it is the misuse of property
that deprives the poor:
Riches are a form of strength; and a strong man does
not injure others by keeping his strength, but by
using it injuriously, (XVII, 106n)
His relegation of material concerns to second place dis
gruntled leftists and rightists who saw the issues in
^Ibid., I, 273.
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material terms only.

John D. Rosenberg says that Ruskin

did not desire to "invalidate the security of property."
Rather, he desired to
extend its range and whereas it has long been known
and declared that the poor have no right to the pro
perty of the rich, I wish it also to be known and
declared that the rich have no right to the property
of the poor.®
There may be some inconvenience to the rich, how
ever, if they extend justice and knowledge to the poor.
They may have to forego a few of their luxuries.

But,

such will only be a temporary condition until all people
achieve a decent standard of living.
afford more things may have them.

Then those who can

However,

luxury at present can only be enjoyed by the ignorant;
the cruelest man living could not sit at his feast,
unless he sat blindfold. (XVII, 114)
IIIo

UNSELFISHNESS

The idea that social wrongs are artificial and
not natural lies behind Ruskin's belief that God has so
organized the world that if a man works well, he should
have life's necessities, plus a few luxuries, rest, and
^Rosenberg, pp. 108-109.
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leisure. In terms of a nation, it is the misapplication
or insufficiency of labor that results in misery, hard
ship, and unemployment.

Man's error causes economic pro

blems; the world is not naturally constituted so (XVI,
18-19).
One of the ideas that Ruskin sees as the kind of
artificiality that blinds people from the true ends of
a society is their restricted concept of money, wealth,
and value.

In Unto This Last Ruskin sets out to redefine

these economic terms in their full implications.

The purely

theoretical science of political economy had limited these
tems in justifying the processes of industrialism. Parody
ing the reasoning of the political economists, Ruskin poses
definitions of money, wealth, and value in their broadest
and historical sense. Thus, he exposes the incompleteness
of contemporary economic theories.
Basically, the purpose of a society is not to make
a few rich at the expense of many, but rather to make life
a joyful experience for everyone.

With this idea in mind,

Ruskin broadens the concept of money, for example.

When

many people need the essentials of life, how one spends
his money is important.

He should not spend his money
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only on himself, thinking that he is giving others work.
He must also consider the kind of work to which he is
putting them.

Instead of buying one expensive suit of

clothes, a person should buy six cheaper suits, wear one
and give five away.

In this way the workers will receive

the benefits of their labors much sooner (XVI, 48).
People must not think that their money is their
own and that they may spend it however they wish.

They

get this idea because they think that money is not Godgiven like talent, intellect, or good birth.

Although

the money itself may not be God-given, the ability to earn
it is. Therefore, it should not be used to deprive others,
but to help them.

People scorn a physical bully, but not

an economic one. The poor exist for the rich to help, and
this is why the ability to make money is God-given (XVI,
99-103).
Most people equate "value" with how much money
a thing is worth. This is another artificial idea that
obscures reality. The Latin root word for "value" means
to be strong m life, or valiant as applied to men.

In

reference to things it means to be strong for life:

"To

be 'valuable,' therefore, is to 'avail towards life.'"
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If an article does not "lead to life," then it is less
valuable. The term, "value," in a true science of politi
cal economy, "teaches nations to desire and labour for
the things that lead to life. ..." As air, light, clean
liness, peace, trust, and love are more conducive to life
than gold or iron, they are more valuable (XVII, 84-85).
In his redefinition of value, Ruskin is again
scientific rather than sentimental. Patrick Geddes, in
John Ruskin, Economist (1884), notes how closely Ruskin's
social criticism follows scientific biological fact, that
"intrinsic value is the absolute power of anything to
support life." Geddes continues:
The inductive logic and statistics, the physics and
chemistry, the biology and medicine, the psychology
and education were all essentially on the side of
Mr. Ruskin; while on the other were too often sheer
blindness to the actual facts of human and social
life-organism, function, and environment alike.^
As he redefines "value" in terms of its contribu
tion to life, so Ruskin redefines "wealth." He questions
Mill's definition of wealth as meaning "to have a large
stock of useful articles." He examines "have" as a quality
of possession and "useful" as a quality of utility. What
^Quoted in Cook, II, 135.
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is the nature of possession and utility?

To possess an

article depends upon the ability of the "possessor" to use
it.

A dead saint, clasping a gold cross in his coffin,

cannot be said to "have" it, nor can a man sinking in the
ocean with two hundred pounds of gold strapped to him be
said to possess the gold.

Sometimes a person cannot con

trol an object, even though he may "own" it. Thus "wealth"
is expanded to mean "the possession of useful articles
which we can use" or control.

Ruskin, in characteristic

fashion, shifts attention from the object to the person.
Here, the ability of the possessor determines the "wealth"
of an item, not the inherent characteristics of the item
itself (XVII, 86-87).
"Use" implies its opposite, "ab-use." Whether or
not an article is useful depends upon the person.
had a dual aspect to the Greeks.

Wine

As Bacchus, it was useful

in "cheering god and man." That is, it strengthened both
the reasoning and carnal powers of man.

As Dionysus, wine

hurt man's spiritual and bodily powers.

The Greeks also

considered that the human body could be used or ab-used.
When disciplined, it served the State in war and labor.
When undisciplined, it was valueless to the State.
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Hence . . . if a thing is to be useful, it must
be not only of an availing nature, but in availing
hands....
Wealth, therefore, is "THE POSSESSION OF THE VAL
UABLE BY THE VALIANT. . .
The value of the thing,
and the valour of its possessor must be estimated
together. (XVII, 87-88)
Just as he looks through a painting to see how
well it represents nature or experience, so Ruskin looks
through the vocabulary of the political economists to see
how their terms reflect experience.
finds that vocabulary wanting.

Needless to say, he

It is like the artistic

conventions which obscure the real truths of existence
from artists and viewers alike.

In a sense, such a vocabu

lary is an unsympathetic fallacy by which the political
economists cast their own preconceived notions upon the
social structure and see what they want to see.

Certainly

their theories serve the limited purpose for which they
are devised, but so does any artistic convention and tech
nique. The problem in both cases is that without reference
to fact of experience in the broad sense, their validity
becomes inapplicable with time.
But, the vocabulary of the economists is not im
portant to Ruskin as such.

In examining the meaning of

"value" and "wealth," Ruskin looks through the words to
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the things they are supposed to represent. He objects
to the narrowing of the original meaning of wealth by con
fining it to material objects measured only by money.
John A. Hobson says, "He is not ultimately concerned with
the perversion of a word, but with the perversion of an
idea." Ruskin objects to the taking of material objects
as a separate study and announcing that it describes "an
art of national and individual conduct."^®

In his art

criticism he objects to the definition of art in technical
terms on the same grounds.
As value and wealth depend upon people for their
true meaning, so does the term, "price." A fair determina
tion of price, however, is based upon the amount of labor
expended upon a product, rather than upon what others think
the product is worth. Much labor for a small thing is
not "cheapness of labor," but rather "dearness of the ob
ject wrought for" (XVII, 96).
As value, wealth, and price are dependent upon
human factors, then these terms do not really apply to
the amount of property one has; for mines and mills are
worthless unless there are men to work them.
^^Hobson, p. 75.

Wealth lies
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in the power one has over men, rather than in the amount
of property one has (XVII, 46). Therefore, it's very
possible that the men, and not the property or money, are
the wealth. If so, then
the final outcome and consummation of all wealth is
in the producing as many as possible full-breathed,
bright-eyed, and happy human creatures.
Yet, most people do not see men as wealth at all, or if
they do, then they believe that they must be kept in a
low condition (XVII, 55-56).
Ruskin concludes that the real test of production
is how many people can live decent lives on what's pro
duced:
Production does not consist in things laboriously made,
but in things serviceably consumable; and the question
for the nation is not how much labour it employs, but
how much life it produces. For as consumption is the
end and aim of production, so life is the end and aim
of consiimption. (XVII, 104)
In short, "There Is No Wealth But Life." This statement
summarizes Ruskin's idea of the true function of an econom
ic system, the way it would work if man did not produce
such artificialities as political economy.

A true economy

simply operates according to natural principles and is
grounded in truth.

But, the existing "science" of political

economy, based on self-interest, obscures this truth
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(XVII, 105).

In insisting that wealth consists only of

things contributing to "wholesome human wants" and not
in serving base or injurious purposes, Ruskin is basing
true political economy, according to Hobson, on "eternal
and immutable principles of health and disease, justice
and injustice." He is piercing through the "is" of the
political economists to the true "is" which the political
economists only consider the "ought." He refers to the
broader range of human economic affairs rather than the
narrow material concerns of the political economists
IV.

COOPERATION

The only way for society to produce "healthy,
happy human beings" is through cooperation, rather than
competition, of its members. The seeds for this idea
appeared as early as Modern Painters II in the chapters
on "vital beauty" in which Ruskin relates the decaying
effect of impure matter upon healthy matter.

His ideal

state is an analogy of nature in which a state is healthy
only in proportion to the health and welfare of each
^^Ibid., pp. 91-92.
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member.

Xn Modern Painters V he defines composition

as each element in a picture contributing to the picture's
total effect by balancing imperfections in each other,
or "helping" each other.He also repeats this idea in
social and educational terms in A Joy Forever when he says.
Every so named soul of man claims from every other
such soul protection and education in childhood--help
or punishment in middle life--reward or relief, if
needed, in old age.^^
Just as an individual must be able to control his
property and money before it can be thought of as wealth,
so control in a nation has a positive connotation. The
flow of wealth in a country is like the flow of its
streams.

As such it can be directed and distributed by

human laws just as streams are dammed and controlled by
humans for beneficial purposes.

To propose no control

as those do who propose the "law of supply and demand,"
is to propose disaster and misery (XVII, 60-61):
. . . the notion of Discipline and Interference lies
at the very root of all human progress or power; that
l^Francis G. Townsend, Ruskin and the Landscape
Feeling: a Critical Analysis of His Thought during the
Crucial Years of His Life, 1843-1856 (Urbana, 1951), p. 23.
l^Rosenberg, p. 42.
l^uoted in Leon, pp. 266-267.
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the "let-alone" principle is . . . death; that it is
ruin to [man] ; . . if he lets his land alone--if he
lets his fellow-men alone--if he lets his own soul
alone. (XVI, 26)
Secrecy, competition, and enmity in mercantile
dealings are destructive because each person only increases
the difficulty of the other.

Commerce should occur in a

spirit of openness, cooperation, and good-will.

In unity

of effort men produce the greatest and best results.

But

in divided effort, men frustrate the efforts of each other,
and each being on his own, cannot do as much as he could
with help from others (XVI, 95-96).

Here Ruskin is calling

for the narrower "self" to give in to the broader "self"
to be dominated by Justice and Honesty as purifying ele
ments.

When the narrower self does sacrifice itself for

the broader self, then the latter grows "as we identify
our good with that of others."^^
This banding together of men to further the life
elements of a society is an idea which Ruskin got from
reading Plato's The Republic. Rosenberg points out that
he uses "justice" in the same sense that Plato did, that
of man acting in a social, rather than an individual sense.

^^Hobson, p. 98.
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Cooperation, not competition, conduces to a just society.
For Ruskin as for Plato, the state, Rosenberg says, "is a
moral rather than merely a political or economic organism."
As Plato saw no virtue without a just state, so Ruskin sees
no wealth without one.^^
Thus, such things as "the profit motive" are ques
tioned because they further competition and imply unfair
advantage.

Actually, in a just society there can be no

profit for either party in an exchange situation, because
articles of equal value have changed hands.

But, whenever

a profit is made by either party, it means that the other
party has lost something in the transaction.

For one to

profit, he must know something that the other doesn't.
Because it justifies this kind of activity, political
economy is a "nescience" rather than a science. Whereas
other sciences or arts try to do away with their "opposite
nescience and artlessness," the present science "must . . .
promulgate and prolong its opposite nescience; otherwise
the science itself is impossible. It is . . . the science
of darkness ..." (XVII, 91-92).
l^Rosenberg, p. 134.

106
In a just society a merchant, because he cooperates
with others to further life in the community, is honored
as much as doctors, lawyers, and clergymen are honored.
But the basic selfishness of the merchants separates them
from these professions.

As these professions serve human

ity, so should the merchants.

Doctors heal, lawyers en

force justice, and clergymen teach. Merchants should also
serve by providing food and clothing and essentials of
life. The people in the other professions are prepared
to sacrifice themselves to fulfill their duties.

So should

the merchants be prepared to sacrifice their economic life
to get essentials of life to the people.

As they are not

prepared to sacrifice themselves, but rather exist to serve
themselves first, they are isolated and not honored in
society. (XVII, 38-39)
Not only must merchants be more attentive to
material needs, but they should also be attentive to the
moral condition of society.

They should produce items

that would appeal to the good qualities in people rather
than to their lower desires. Businessmen are not to be
less ambitious, but more ambitious. With their vast eco
nomic power, they also carry great moral power, and they
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should exercise this power, in keeping with the moral
responsibility that goes with it.

With business leading

the way to morality, there is hope for European art and
manufacture (XVI, 343-45).
Cooperation would also solve the unemployment pro
blem.

England's problem is not in finding work for her

men, but in finding men for her work. Harbors need develop
ment, and streets need to be built and repaired.

Theife

is a vast amount of work to be done on the nation's farms
as well:
The serious question for you is not how many you have
to feed, but how much you have to do; it is our in
activity, not our hunger, that ruins us. (XVI, 22-23)
One way merchants could cooperate would be to reinstitute a guild system in order to eliminate individual
competition and commercial warfare.

Such guilds would

open the way to "more social and communicative systems"
(XVI, 97).
Another way to promote cooperation, would be a
"paternalistic" government.

Ruskin is not calling for an

institutional change, but a mental change. Up to now
government has been considered in a merely judicial sense.
But, there should be a system of "laws, councils, or kings"
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that would provide for the economic direction of the nation,
just as a father directs his household (XVI, 25-26).

What

the physical form of the government should be makes little
difference.

The nation must be brought together and headed

for some positive goal.

Pursuit of self-interest does not

weld a society together.
As stated before, Ruskin does not desire to redis
tribute property.

His reasoning is to make people consider

what the true ends of a society are, and once they admit
that serving themselves first does not lead to fulfilling
the ends of society, then they will use their money and
property in the desirable way.

He is not a "slave to a

fixed idea, the owner of a panacea applied indiscriminately
to cure all evils." Although he passionately denounces
evil, he never becomes so absorbed with it that it domin
ates his mind.

Industrial dishonesty does not cause a

bitter class resentment in him, nor does it cause him to
require structural reforms.

Education is the cure. John

A. Hobson concludes:
In a word, his social mission was distinctively an
ethical rather than a political one; and he never lost
sight of the first requirement of all valid ethical
teaching, the need "to see life steadily and see it
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whole."^7
Greatness in a society, then, is the degree to
which its members cooperate to answer the needs of life,
both materially and spiritually.

If Ruskin emphasizes

the material aspects, it is from the same desire to obtain
a foundation in reality that exists in producing great
art. He calls for both a vitalizing and idealizing pro
cess in a nation's economy.

Hobson says.

The reduction of money-cost and money-measured utility
to the pains of production and the pleasures of con
sumption, estimated in accordance with the actual de
sires and feelings of those who produce and consume,
would be a vitalizing process.
But, granted that workers are happy and healthy, the ideal
izing process is important, too:
Neither order nor progress is possible or conceivable
without ideals; . . . the welfare of an individual
or a nation implies a standard of true humanity to
which the desires and caprices of the moment must
be referred.
In calling for cooperation, Ruskin is calling for
the same submission of ego in members of society as he
calls for in the artist. The same idea of losing one's
life to find it applies to both messages.
l^Hobson, p. 58.
l^Ibid., pp. 96-97.

The obstacles,
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however, are the same.

They are pride and attention to

artificial theories which obscure the true nature of things.
They negate the element of man's soul, and they result
from the kind of mind which lacks penetrative imagination
and merely plays on the material surfaces of things.

Such

a society not only cannot produce great art, but it also,
in its neglect of essential life-producing goals, is in
danger of the very ossification of man that the political
economists assume in their theories.
For these reasons, Ruskin sees it fit to conclude
his final volume of Modern Painters with a statement of
apparent helplessness in changing the course of English
society, followed by a warning:
I do not know what my England desires, or how long
she will choose to do as she is doing now;--with her
right hand casting away the souls of men, and with
her left the gifts of God. (VII, 457)
So far as you desire to possess, rather than to
give; so far as you look for power to command, in
stead of to bless; so far as your own prosperity seems
to you to issue out of contest or rivalry . . . with
other men or other nations; so long as the hope before
you is for supremacy instead of love; and your desire
is to be greatest, instead of least;—first, instead
of last;--so long you are serving the Lord of . . .
Death. (VII, 460)

CHAPTER IV
THE SOCIOLOGY OF ART
For either to be vital, art and society must
function together, society providing for art and art re
ferring to society.

Ruskin states the need for this in

terrelationship when he says that there are two divisions
in the economy of nations and households:
splendor.
other.

utility and

Neither is to be neglected in favor of the

The pursuit of material things and their accumula

tion not only neglects beauty and culture, but it also
develops a mind that sees things only in material terms.
On the other hand, the pursuit of splendor, pomp, art, and
rich dress has also been the prelude to national ruin.^
There must be a middle ground between a "too laborious
England" and a "too luxurious Italy." This middle ground
is "neither oppressed by labor nor wasted in vanity--the
^The Works of John Ruskin, ed. E. T. Cook and
Alexander Wedderburn, Library Edition, 39 vols. (London,
1903-1912), XVI, 20. Reference to this edition will be
by volume and page number, and will be included in the
text.
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condition of a peaceful and thoughtful temperance in aims,
and acts, and arts" (XVI, 342).
I. SOCIETY TO PROVIDE FOR ART
The concentration upon industrialism and commer
cialism was destroying what Ruskin felt were conditions
necessary for great art.

By ignoring nature and broad

considerations for mankind, as exenplified in the deeper
and more important needs of the human soul, the mechanical
mind was widening the gulf between the practical and ideal.
Permanent values such as faith, love, and cooperation were
being undermined by concerns for change in order to "make
money." Much of Ruskin*s work reveals a desire for these
permanent values.

Advancing industrialism and commercialism

were destroying the natural scenery of English and European
landscape, which Ruskin had long felt was a source of gen
uine artistic expression.

Restoration of the European

cathedrals was replacing the authentic works of the past
with the kind of imitation without belief which Ruskin
deplored.

He felt these changes personally:

There are no inns, no human beings any more anywhere;
nothing but endless galleries of rooms, arid automata
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in millions, I can't travel, I have taken to stones
and plants.^
Evidence of the soul's participation in rendering
a viable environment was being replaced by pure intellec
tual calculations, independent of feeling in the affairs
of men. The only retreat was to remnants of nature, stones
and plants, S3mibols of former excellence in architecture,
sculpture, and painting.

Ruskin's conclusion is that given

the present tendency of development, every acre of England
and Europe will be either mine-pit or factory site.
these circumstances no beautiful art is possible.

Under

English

men cannot hope to have both art and an England devoid of
nature (XVI, 338).
Former works of beauty as a result of nature's
influence are being neglected. In the midst of factories,
for example, sits a once-stately Carolingian mansion, now
abandoned.
a weed.

Its once-fertile garden will not even support

An English artist doesn't have much to go on here.

In contrast, medieval northern Italian artists had for
their "school of design" towns with colorfully-dressed
^Quoted in Holbrook Jackson, "Ruskin," Dreamers of
Dreams; The Rise and Fall of Nineteenth-Century Idealism
(New York, 1949), p. 132.
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people and white marble buildings shining under clear sun
light (XVI, 338-40).

Ruskin compares the environmental

influences upon Turner as a boy in the late eighteenth
century with those upon Georgione, who grew up in fifteenthcentury Venice.

Venice had bright streets, vital architec

ture, and robust people of strong religious faith as re
flected in both their public and private lives.

Late

eighteenth-century London, however, provided Turner with
dark, littered lanes and miserable, hypocritical people,
Georgione, consequently, delighted in painting city life,
but Turner fled the city to paint country scenes after
he first experienced the freshness and purity of nature
for the first time (VII, 387).
For the English to be able to produce artists of
the excellence of Turner and the Venetians, they must
develop some kind of vision of the ultimate condition their
city and country are to attain.

With such a vision, they

can order the growth of city and nation so that conditions
for great art become possible.

But, as they are going now,

with only material wealth as their goal, there will be
no sense of plan in England's industrial development. It
may be that the English are satisfied with the prospect of
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all flatlands being iron, coal, clay and lime pits and
the mountains serving as quarries, for this is the direc
tion in which they are heading (XVI, 337-38).
The kind of thinking nourished in an industrial
society indicates a more fundamental separation between
people than merely in how much money they are able to ac
cumulate:
The persons who become rich are . . . industrious,
resolute, proud, covetous, prompt, methodical, sensible,
unimaginative, insensitive, and ignorant. The persons
who remain poor are the entirely foolish, the entirely
wise, the idle, the reckless, the humble, the thought
ful, the dull, the imaginative, the sensitive, the
well-informed, the improvident, the irregularly and
impulsively wicked, the clumsy knave, the open theif,
and the entirely merciful, just, and godly person.
(XVII, 90)
As the more powerful people lack the qualities of
soul that Ruskin deems essential in both art and society,
they tend to ignore the engendering or nourishment of these
qualities in their educational systems.

Education is di

rected only toward developing intellectual qualities, with
the result that things like drawing are considered inferior
to writing. Further, anyone possessing visual and manual
abilities are neglected in school curriculums.
they become "runaways and bad scholars."

Consequently,

These people see
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truly "while your well-behaved and amiable scholars are
disciplined into blindness and palsy of half their facul
ties" (V, 376-77).

The division, then, extends from

society, through the educational system, down into the
individual.

Unification of mind and heart becomes impossi

ble.
The nature of work to which men are put in the
factories also discourages artistic invention.

Repetitious

work goes against human nature, because it discounts the
deeper abilities of men in terms of their putting their
souls into their work. Work that is meaningless to a man
cannot engage his heart.

Artists and craftsmen should not

be employed to draw, carve, or make identical articles.
As men are individuals, they produce different results.
Allowing individual expression will result in their be
coming more interested in what they are doing.

Conse

quently, they will do better work, and more of it (XVI,
37). William Morris, in a preface to The Nature of Gothic,
which he published separately in 1892, summarizes Ruskin's
unique contribution in this regard:
. . . the lesson which Ruskin here teaches us, is that
art is the expression of man's pleasure in labor; that
it is possible for man to rejoice in his work, for.
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strange as it may seem to us to-day, there have been
times when he did rejoice in it, and lastly, that un
less man's work once again becomes a pleasure to him,
the token of which change will be that beauty is once
again a natural and necessary accompaniment of produc
tive labour, all but the worthless must toil in pain,
and therefore live in pain.
In short, a society which recognizes only one half
of human nature cannot produce the kind of art in which
the influence of the human soul can be seen. Great art
grows out of a great society, and a society which does
not recognize the total nature of man and his deep needs
is not great:
Without observation and experience, no design-without peace and pleasureableness in occupation, no
design--and all the lecturings, and teachings, and
prizes, and principles of art, in the world, are of
no use, so long as you don't surround your men with
happy influences and beautiful things. . . . Inform
their minds, refine their habits, and you form and
refine their designs; but keep them illiterate, un
comfortable, and in the midst of unbeautiful things,
and whatever they do will still be spurious, vulgar,
and valueless. (XVI, 341)
II. ART TO REFER TO SOCIETY
In its turn, art, to be meaningful to a society which
provides the conditions to produce it, must reciprocate
3Quoted in Derrick Leon, Ruskin;
(London, 1949), p. 178.

The Great Victorian
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and refer to the people, their nation, and their god.
True beauty results when this fusion of art and societyis achieved.

By depicting what's important in a society,

art serves as a unifying influence:
There never was, nor can be, any essential beauty
possessed by a work of art, which is not based on
the conception of its honored permanence, and local
influence, as a part of appointed and precious furni
ture, either in the cathedral, the house, or . . .
thoroughfare. . . . (XVI, 10)
That art should have a place in the everyday lives
of people seems to be a strange notion.

Ordinarily one

thinks of great art as something aloof from everyday life,
something kept in massive galleries and jealously guarded.
But, Ruskin believes that great art should be available
to as many people as possible.

He prefers private galleries

to large public ones, because those who own the works will
take better care of them than some incompetent, job-seeking
curator.

He feels that when the public sees these works

in a domestic setting, the art will seem imich more meaning
ful and not so strange (XVI, 80-81).
Great art is most effective when it is decorative,
for then it becomes involved most closely with humanity.
Ruskin chides art students for thinking that decorative
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art is ignoble. This view of art is too restrictive, the
result of not placing art's function in its true perspec
tive:
The best sculpture yet produced has been the decoration
of a temple front--the best painting, the decoration
of a room.
Because decorative art combines various pieces of art for
a total effect, it is really noble:

"'Portable* art--

independent of all place--is . . . ignoble art" (XVI,
319-20).
By separating architecture and sculpture, English
architects have dimished the power of both:

sculpture's

because it has no room for the story-telling function it
had when it decorated buildings; architecture's because
it has been reduced to mere rules of mechanism (XVI, 360).
There is no essential difference between architecture and
sculpture.

Any architect can draw moldings, and all archi

tects prefer some molding to no ornamentation.

There is

little difference between drawing moldings and drawing
the folds of a draped statue (XVI, 358). The only way that
architects can really use their imaginations is to become
sculptors as well as architects in the spirit of the Greek,
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Phidias, and the Italians--Michael Angelo, Orcagna, Pisano,
and Giotto (XVI, 360-61).
The underlying thought in The Two Paths is, as
Ruskin points out in the preface, the danger of separating
art from its reference to society and nature.

He says

that he is holding out to the art student the choice "be
tween two modes of study, which involve ultimately the
development, or deadening, of every power he possesses."
The student must recognize
the hour and the point of life when the way divides
itself, one leading to the Olive mountains--one to
the vale of the Salt Sea. . . . Let him pause at the
parting of The Two Paths. (XVI, 353-54)
The choice, of course, is whether to work according
to nature or according to technique and convention. Ruskin
illustrates the problem by linking these two "modes of
study" with the kind of thinking productive of them.
Northern Scotchmen are devoid of art, yet they have noble
character.

The people of India have a great deal of art,

yet they are savage and cruel.

The difference is not the

absence of art among the Scotch and the presence of it
in the Indians, but rather the presence of a love of nature
in the Scotch and the absence of it in the Indians. Indian
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art is pure design; there is no relation to natural fact
in it. Ruskin concludes:
. . . art, followed as such and for its own sake,
irrespective of the interpretation of nature by it,
is destructive of whatever is best and noblest in
humanity. . . .
Nature, "simply observed," ennobles humanity.

Art, con

nected with nature, becomes "helpful and ennobling, also"
(XVI, 268).
Yet, art must be more than simply connected with
nature in the narrow sense. If society is included in the
term, nature, then such art is meaningful. Taken by it
self, the landscape feeling is really valueless because it
cannot be applied to practice.

Art must unite thought

and action, the ideal and nature.

By itself, the land

scape feeling and the resultant art represent the very
form of conventionalism that Ruskin sees as ignoble (X,
376). But, because it does refer to nature, it has the
redeeming quality of uniting thought and sight in perceiving
nature truly (V, 363). The reason the landscape feeling
is so ineffectual is that modern people do not believe
that God is in nature.

It has always been the element

of the human mind which brings man to God and the revelation
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of sacred truths.

In the Sermon on the Mount, Christ

directed men to observe nature in order to perfect their
minds (V, 378-79).

But now,

. . . all true landscape, whether simple or exalted,
depends primarily for its interest on connection with
humanity or with spiritual powers. Banish your heroes
and nymphs from the classical landscape--its laurel
shades will move you no more. Show that the dark clefts
of the most romantic mountain are uninhabited and untraversed; it will cease to be romantic. (VII, 255)
Picturesque art, as it is painted on the continent,
is nobler than English picturesque because it embodies
a sense of man's suffering, poverty, and decay.

Unlike

the English, who try, in their tidiness and cleanliness,
to deny "human calamity," Continental people sense "the
pathos of character" hidden beneath their old cathedrals
(VI, 14-15).

Turnerian picturesque is superior, too, be

cause he has a "communion of heart" with his picturesque
subjects:

"the lower picturesque ideal is eminently a

heartless one." It is heartless because the artist delights
only in the outward, visual pleasure without sensing the
effect time has on the people connected with the structure
being depicted.

But, Turner makes his ruined buildings

and cathedrals symbolic of people's lives.

By rendering "the heart" of old buildings artists
give a sense of continuity and stability in a society,
as well. There is created a healthy attitude among the
people toward their past.

The Tower of Calais church is

an example of a people who live comfortably with their
past.

Old as it is, the people still use it, because it

is not strange to them.

The English, so sensitive to what

is fashionable and what is not, remove vestiges of age
from their midst as soon as they can.

Nothing on the

Continent is "in" or "out" of "fashion" (VI, 12-13).
Each generation should regard both its past and
future, and provide for them.

It must make its present

works useful for future generations.

At the same time

it should accept the work handed to it by preceeding genera
tions; it should not destroy or tear down old works of
art or structures by thinking that these past works are
useless.

Concern only for the present results not only

in forgetting those who tried to produce greatness in the
past, but also in being forgotten by future generations
who truly cannot use works which grow useless with time
(XVI, 63).
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Works of genius should be made of durable materials
so that they may be seen in all ages.

An extreme example

of genius wasted is Prince Medici's command to Michael
Angelo to carve a sculpture in snow. Yet, as artists and
craftsmen are made to work with cheap materials, the English
are being no different in their foresight than the "unworthy
prince" (XVI, 39).
The rendering of truth in one's own time renders
that truth for all time, and such art is accomplished only
by great artists who render the heart and not the exterior
of people. They provide faces and expressions of the pre
sent, then provide exteriors of the past.
do not bother them (V, 127-28).

Anachronisms

Such an artist is Tintoret

to. His "The Last Judgment" occurs in Venice, and the faces
of local Venetians are depicted.

Emotions become more

genuinely depicted than those expressed in the more stereo
typed paintings of the same subject by lesser artists.^
A good understanding of Ruskin's concept of the
sociology of art is seen in his discussion, "Iron in Nature"
in the fifth lecture of The Two Paths. Implicit in this
^Van Akin Burd, "Ruskin's Quest for a Theory of
Imagination," Modern Language Quarterly, XVII (March, 1956),
71.
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discussion, also, is his idea of the sort of thinking con
ducive to a viable society.

He says that most people con

sider rusty iron a spoiler of spring water and a generally
worthless thing.

On the other hand, they consider polished

knives and razors more useful and desirable.

But, iron's

tendency to rust is a virtue, not a fault, "for in that
condition it fulfills its most important functions in the
universe, and most kindly duties to mankind. . . . Iron
rusted is Living, but when pure or polished. Dead" (XVI,
376-77). The rust shows that the iron has taken in oxygen,
the "breath of life." This combination of iron and air
is not only nobler than polished steel, but more useful:
". . . the main service of this metal ... is not in making
k n i v e s , . . . b u t i n making t h e ground w e f e e d f r o m . . . "
(XVI, 377).
Iron in the ground is universal, too. It gives
the earth its brown color.

Otherwise the earth would be

a "dirty white ... in all places, and at all times."
Not only does it color the earth, but it also colors the
bricks from which the English build their comfortable,
warm-looking cottages (XVI, 379-80).
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Iron oxide spans continents, time, and economic
classes.

It colors flint and marble and many jewels of

the rich. But, the poor can admire the purpleness of hills
seen at a distance.

Iron oxide formed the purple in por

phyry, so much admired by the Greeks and Romans.

It "gives

flush to all the rosy granite of Egypt . . . and to the
rosiest summits of the Alps . . . (XVI, 381-84).
No other passage in Ruskin's works in the years
1856-1860 seems to symbolize so well the body of his
thought at this time.

His idea of the nobility of rusty

iron shows how far away popular thought has drifted from
considerations of natural fact. As a S3nnbol of society
and industrialism, iron is an index of how artificial and
technical men have become:

they fail to see or value the

life-giving nature of iron just as they fail to consider
the life-giving ends society and industry should have.
Society, as it exists, is iron polished.
But, just as iron must unite with oxygen to be
of service in nature, so must art, to be of service to
man, unite body and soul.

But, amateur artists and workmen

try to work with their hands alone, improving their tech
nique. All this is useless because "without mingling of

heart-passion with hand-power, no fine art is possible"
(XVI, 385).
If iron represents society, and if oxygen repre
sents art, the union of these two major elements to pro
duce life is also easily understood.

Ruskin's iron

"parable" seems to operate on three levels:

the need

in the individual for the unification of fact and ideal
to produce great art, the need for society to see value
in human lives, and the need for society and art to fuse
for the creation of true vitality, both material and
spiritual, and wholeness.
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